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TI4E CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTERIZATIONS
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INTRODUCTION
In his book Stacked Deck: A Story of Selfishness in America,1 law pro-
fessor and philosopher Lawrence Mitchell attends to the structural features
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. I would like to acknowl-
edge the participants in the 1998 Western Law Teachers of Color Conference and the
Fall 1999 Faculty Workshop at St. John's Law School for their contributions to the ideas
in this article. I am also grateful to Professors Penelope Andrews, Pamela Edwards, Tanya
Hernandez, Beryl Jones, Twila Perry, Deborah Post, and Patricia Williams for their
comments on earlier drafts. This research is supported by a grant from the Filomen
D'Agostino and Max Greenberg Research Fund at the New York University School of
Law.
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of inequality2 by inverting the self-referential perspective of John Rawls'
concept of original position3 to an other-directed focus. He challenges
what he considers to be liberalism's fatal flaw: the denial that privilege
and disadvantage determine individual power and position, rather than
hard work and ability. According to Mitchell, the law also shares this
limitation by creating an individual subject that is self-reliant and inde-
pendent. Only through rejecting this myth and moving from an ethic of
formal equality to an ethic of caring can we achieve a fair and equitable
social order.
Professor Mitchell does not ask us to envision a just society behind a
veil of ignorance, not knowing where we will be positioned. Rather, he
asks us to envision a structure which would be fair to our children, who
are intrinsically vulnerable and the natural objects of our love and care. In
creating such a structure, in dialogue with others who have children, we
would not likely develop, either intentionally or unintentionally, a win-
ner-take-all society.
Like Professor Mitchell, progressive race theorists seek to develop
theories of justice that avoid the strictures of classical liberal theory
without necessarily rejecting liberalism itself 4 Among the many
contributions of Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering in
Post-Civil Rights America,' is Professor Eric Yamamoto's recommendation
of an even more radical change in perspective on the problem of
persistent structural inequality. 6 He does not limit his focus to children-
2. According to Professor Mitchell, individuals are vulnerable because of racism,
sexism, poverty, ignorance, downsizing and layoffs, unsafe products, and stock market
manipulation. See id. at 41-43.
3. For a description of John Rawls' concept of original position, see RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 150-59 (1978).
4. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Sources of Commitment to Social Justice, 4 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 175 (1998); see also Derrick Bell, Racial Realism-After We're Gone:
Prudent Speculations on America in a Post-Racial Epoch, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 393 (1990);
Kimber6 Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Mari Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence
and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16
N.M. L. REV. 613 (1986).
5. 95 MICH. L. REV. 821 (1997) [hereinafter Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis]; see also
Eric Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: Agency, Responsibility and Interracial Justice, 3 UCLA
ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 33 (1995). Professor Yamamoto has expanded his ideas in his re-
cently published book, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-
CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA (1999). The comments in this essay are addressed to the ideas in
his article, Critical Race Praxis.
6. Professor Yamamoto's critique extends beyond Professor Mitchell's in addressing
not only the structural features of inequality but the representational aspects as well. See
Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 5, at 840-44.
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the most tragic victims of our nation's crisis of race and class-but takes
as his polestar the increasingly tense, uneasy interaction of groups
disadvantaged by racial and ethnic subjugation," and he questions the near
mythological concept "people of color," a characterization which
promotes a vision of unity among groups which share a similar condition,
but which often conceals overlapping and conflicting theoretical and
practical issues. 9 Professor Yamamoto calls for progressives to abandon the
obsession with the injustice of particularized circumstances and personal
or group-specific notions of freedom. He calls for a decreased emphasis
on justice, as it is conceived through law, and an expanded idea of racialS 10
justice and the tools necessary for its attainment.
7. See MANNING MARABLE, BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE 208 (1995):
In the area of health care, six out of ten pre-school children in New
York City are not immunized. There are currently only ninety-six nurses
for the six hundred elementary schools throughout the city. Every day in
New York, 70,500 children use drugs. Thirty-five babies are born daily
with low birth weights. More than 160,000 children, mostly African
American and Latino, have no health insurance. And today, AIDS is the
leading cause of death in New York City for children under the age of
five. In the area of housing and homelessness, New York currently has
about 90,000 homeless people, 90 per cent of whom are black and His-
panic. Every night, some 24,000 people, including nearly 10,000
children, will sleep in city-run homeless shelters. During the next five
years, one out of every twelve black children in New York City will
sleep in a homeless shelter.
8. This tension is exemplified by contemporary civil rights litigation in the state of
California where antidiscrimination laws designed to end the subordination of non-White
groups (and women) are used by non-Whites themselves to claim subordination by other
non-Whites. See Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 5, at 821-24.
9. The term "people of color" often refers not only to the possibility of progressive
coalition among subordinated racial groups but also to the changing demographics of the
population of the United States. These demographic changes, in turn, challenge the con-
tinued characterization of non-Whites as "minorities," and the propriety of a bi-polar
notion of racial conflict. Other issues are also implicated, such as the impact of the ree-
mergence of an ethnicity paradigm in place of or along side a focus on race, and most
importantly, the question whether, and if so how, these demographic and theoretical
shifts will be used either to further domination or liberation for all groups. See discussion
infra Part I.
10. Professor Yamamoto draws a distinction between law, as it conceives of justice,
and racial justice as it is experienced by racialized groups. He explores three aspects of
law's dissociation from racial justice: the historic connection of law to racial oppression;
the limited reach of antidiscrimination law, in particular its failure to redress claims of
cultural discrimination and institutional racism; and the inadequacy of the White-on-
Black racial paradigm for resolving increasingly complex conflicts among communities of
color. See Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 5, at 839-66.
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Professor Yamamoto describes two civil rights litigations in the state
of California, Ho v. San Francisco United School District" and United Minori-
ties v. San Francisco,'2 which exemplify a growing phenomenon in
contemporary civil rights litigation: antidiscrimination laws designed to
end the subordination of non-Whites (and women) are used by non-
Whites themselves to claim subordination by other non-Whites. Several
factors characterize these suits, and they signal important disconnections
between progressive race theory and practice. First, through a myriad of
factors, the rhetoric of individualism and aspects of neoconservative race
theory are deployed by one subordinated racial group against one or
more other similarly subordinated groups. 3 Second, these suits are
marked by the absence of progressive race theory and its practitioners
either behind the scenes or in the litigations themselves. 14 Third, there is
no evidence of critical inquiry into the interminority dynamics at the
heart of each litigation.
5
11. No. C-94-2418 (N.D. Cal. 1994). In Ho, Chinese American plaintiffs in San
Francisco seek to invalidate a 1983 consent decree desegregating San Francisco's public
schools. The consent decree, which was approved initially in a class action brought by the
NAACP charging discrimination by Whites, mandates racial and ethnic diversity in stu-
dent bodies and establishes a 40% cap for students from any one racial or ethnic group in
each "magnet" school. Chinese Americans benefited initially from the decree's diversity
mandate, substantially increasing their enrollments. However, the Chinese American
plaintiffs who now seek to exceed the forty-percent cap claim that the effect of the cap is
to grant unconstitutional racial preferences to those who are less qualified, particularly
African Americans and Latinos.
12. No. C-91-2350 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 1994). In United Minorities, African Ameri-
cans and Latinos bring an employment discrimination action charging preferential
treatment of Chinese Americans.
13. Among the factors deployed in these litigations, Professor Yamamoto cites the
statements of supporters of one or both of the parties in the litigation, legal filings, and
media portrayals employing racialized rhetoric, demeaning stereotypes and neonconserva-
tive race theory. He characterizes neoconservative race theory as a strategy focused on
merit, individual rights, colorblindness, and cultural and intellectual inferiority of one
group in relation to one or more others. See Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 5,
at 822-23.
14. See id. at 825-26.
15. Through a series of questions, Professor Yamamoto identifies three unstated as-
pects of the interminority dynamics present in each litigation: (1) intergroup power ("Is
affirmative action, as neoconservatives argue, 'discrimination against Asians in order to
protect blacks'-making Asian Americans the 'new victims' of racism and African Ameri-
cans, and to a lesser extent Latinos, the 'new perpetrators?' Or is this constriction of
interracial conflict a mask for continued white supremacy?"); (2) the fit of civil rights law
("Is the traditional antidiscrimination-law scheme workable for multiracial conflicts in
post-civil rights America? Or is it necessary to remake the white on black jurisprudential
paradigm?"); and (3) context ("How do the volatile mid-1980s Asian American admis-
sions controversy and the mid-1990s California Civil Rights Initiative and the University
of California affirmative action repeal contextualize the intergroup issues in Ho? And why
[VOL. 5:53
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How might progressive theorists, lawyers, and activists "working in
post-civil rights America bridge both the gap 'of chasmic proportions'
between progressive race theory and political lawyeing practice and the
growing divide between law and racial justice," as defined by the experi-
ences of racialized groups?' 6 Professor Yamamoto responds by offering
"the beginnings of a critical race praxis."' 7 In lieu of a fully-developed
description of this praxis, Yamamoto puts forth four starting points or
guidelines. 8 These guidelines are specifically designed to aid in the con-
duct of civil rights litigation and the resolution of other conflicts in which
the interests of two or more subordinated racial groups are pitted against
each other in a zero-sum competition over what may be viewed as the
limited benefits of legal justice. 9 Drawn from the intuitions of "critical
do intergroup issues of apparent legal and political import, scrutinized by race scholars,
appear to evaporate in Ho amid lawyerly formulation of legal argument and strategy?").
Id. at 826. (footnotes omitted) (citing Ho v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 965 F.
Supp. 1316 (N.D. Cal. 1997)).
16. Id. at 828-29 (footnote omitted).
17. Id.
18. Yamamoto's four guideposts are "the conceptual, the performative, the material,
and the reflexive." Id. at 830. The conceptual guideline suggests a contextualization of
the controversy to examine how racialization occurs and to focus on intersections with
heterosexism, patriarchy, and class. The performative guideline, focused on action, has
two dimensions: (i) identifying practical steps that respond not only to the particular
controversy but also to the history of grievances among the groups involved, and (ii)
choosing who (ideally, progressive race theorists) should take action. The material
guideline addresses changes in the material conditions of racial oppression at two levels: (i)
the socio-structural level, which involves redistribution of societal goods, and (ii) the
representational level which deals with changes in the assessment of cultural traits and
racial identities. The reflexive guideline requires scholars and lawyers to re-integrate
experience into praxis so that theory is developed in light of the actual experiences of
groups. See id. at 876-80 (footnote omitted).
19. Yamamoto acknowledges the continuing significance of legal justice under the
traditional civil rights paradigm but argues that it "increasingly is experienced by racialized
communities as racial injustice. Indeed, 'embittered' and 'frustrated and misunderstood' is
how a professor and civil rights attorney describes her racial minority clients after
,encounters with civil rights enforcement.' These experiences are symptomatic of the
law's intensifying dissociation from racial justice, or what one sociologist calls America's
,retreat from racial justice.'" Id. at 828.
Professor Yamamoto argues further that the specter of zero-sum competition
among racial groups results from the Supreme Court's transformation of anti-
discrimination jurisprudence from a tool to remedy long-standing racial injustice to one
further securing White majoritarian interests:
Over the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has used America's mul-
tiracial demographics and the existence of interminority competition and
conflict to transform whites from the centuries-long historical oppressor
of people of color into "just another group competing with many oth-
ers." Based on the Court's rulings, whites now can be considered a
FALL 1999]
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race theory, pragmatism, prophetic theology, feminist legal theory, and
environmental justice scholarship,"2' these guidelines are not intended to
"prescribe what racial justice is, or should be, in any particular situation.
Rather, they offer guideposts toward collective, reflective antisubordina-
* ,21
tion practice.
In part to explain the troubling dynamics of contemporary civil
rights litigation such as Ho and United Minorities, Yamamoto posits a
growing disjuncture between progressive race theory and political and
legal practice. He offers critical race praxis in response to two distinct, yet
related, phenomena: the "coalescence of conservative race theory and
political practice into a neoconservative praxis;, 22 and the practical turn in
critical race scholarship emanating from legal theorists on the left,23 a turn
which also reflects others' concern over a theory-practice split. With re-
spect to the latter, Yamamoto argues that this practical turn is needlessly
centered on courts and legal doctrine. He recommends, therefore, that
scholars on the left view litigation as a site of cultural performance 24 to be
guided by progressive race theory and its theorist-practitioners. Specific
litigations should become occasions for the resolution of deeper conflicts
that prevent the occurrence of interracial justice.
Despite the interminoity conflict in civil rights litigation that
Yamamoto and other legal scholars describe, 21 in my view, Professor
Yamamoto's claim of disjuncture is overstated. In addition to scholars,
"victim group with the same moral and legal claims" as other groups
.... In its most recent rulings, the Court has attributed interminority
competition and conflict to "racial factionalism," "separatism," and
"balkanization," which in turn it has attributed to consciousness of racial
differences .... [T]he evil of racism in intensely conflictual multiracial
America is no longer individual and institutional acts of white supremacy,
but rather the recognition of racial differences in the form of racial classi-
fications. Race consciousness leads to factionalization and separatism,
which leads to conflict .... The very existence of governmental racial
classifications, race factions, and interminority conflict are circumstantial
proof of the causal links.
Id. at 861-62 (footnotes omitted).
20. Id. at 830.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 829.
23. See id. at 829, 870-73.
24. See id. at 884-89.
25. See, e.g., Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and
White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. Rv. 957, 957 (1995) (arguing that remedying racial dis-
crimination by relying on racial classifications pits Black and non-Black minority groups
against one another in a struggle to receive limited benefits).
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many activists support his claim,26 but their assertions do not necessarily
prove the point. Several causes contribute to the picture of apparent
dissociation. I would single out from among them the difficult problem
of readily translating theoretical formulations into practical solutions,7 a
factor Professor Yamamoto acknowledges but does not accord the weight
I think it bears.28 I would factor in the additional problem of time lag
between theoretical articulation and prescription, on the one hand, and
hard evidence of their outworking in the practical arena, on the other.
I do agree that the fit between progressive race theory and contem-
porary praxis is often. imprecise for reasons other than translation and
related causes. Progressive race theorists criticize other progressive and
liberal legal theorists for failing to address issues of race either directly or
adequately and for failing to advance beyond description and opaque
29theoretical formulations to material prescriptions. Many find much of
progressive race theory similarly wanting.30
26. See Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 5, at 832 n.41, 834-35 (describing
interviews with political lawyers, scholars, and community activists, and reporting their
opinions on the reasons for the seemingly tenuous connection between progressive race
theory and lawyering practice).
27. Professor Yamamoto does not give credit to the tastes of individual scholars or to
the contributions of their work even if they do not participate in front-line political and
legal struggle. Also, within legal academic circles, the attention of critical scholars has
been diverted to some extent by the battle for legitimacy within the academy and by
battles among various groups of color within progressive race scholarship. More impor-
tantly, however, many scholars are engaged in both scholarly and political pursuits, often
melding the two, without concerning themselves about precise articulations of the rela-
tionship between the two or the need to respond to criticism about the value of their
work. See Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 5.
28. See id. at 834. Professor Yamamoto acknowledges the difficult problem of trans-
lating many of the ideas progressive theorists have about race, law, and social power but
does not address the issue of time lag. See id. at 834.
29. For critiques of the critical legal studies movement, see Cornel West, CLS and a
Liberal Critic, 97 YALE LJ. 757 (1988); Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical
Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 301 (1987)
[hereinafter Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar]; Robert Williams, Taking Rights Aggressively:
The Perils and Promise of Critical Legal Theory for People of Color, 5 LAW & INEQ. J. 103
(1987). For critiques of mainstream feminism, see Paulette Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspec-
tives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE LJ. 365 (1991); Trina Grillo and
Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implication of Making Com-
parisons between Racism and Sexism (or Other -lsms), 1991 DUKE L.J. 397 (1991); Angela P.
Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990).
30. See Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on
Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993); Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitu-
tional Discourse, 81 GEo. L.J. 251 (1992); Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal
Academia, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1745 (1989); Eleanor Brown, Note, The Tower of Babel;
Bridging the Divide Between Critical Race Theory and "Mainstream" Civil Rights Scholarship,
105 YALE L.J. 513 (1995).
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The claim of disjuncture made by Professor Yamamoto and other
critical race theorists appears to rest in part on the view that theory and
practice are (or should be) seamless. Accepting this formulation, to the
extent a separation exists, the fault lies as much with the inadequacies of
theory as with 'its implementation. Professor Yamamoto's singular focus
on praxis is, therefore, counterintuitive; his claim of disjuncture cannot
be assessed without a critique of the assumption that, in its current state of
development, progressive race theory has something of critical, practical
significance to impart to claimants and practitioners in the pursuit of racial
justice.
Professor Yamamoto cites two among other possible causes for the
dissociation he observes between progressive theory and practice: (i) the
"White on Black" (typically referred to as the "Black-White") paradigm
of race3 1 and (ii) the civil rights model of legal justice. Understandably,
Yamamoto does not point out specific prescriptions practitioners may use
to resolve the inter-color group conflicts that increasingly characterize
modern civil rights litigation. 2 Within progressive race scholarship, the
reconstruction of the Black-White paradigm of race is largely
undertheoized,3 3 'and Yamamoto admits that the best intuitions of
31. Professor Yamamoto's reformulation is a more accurate portrayal of the position
of groups under the paradigm than the more typical characterization. See Yamamoto,
Critical Race Praxis, supra note 5, at 826.
32. See id. at 853-55 (describing the intuitions of progressive race theory as at best
heuristic and descriptive).
33. For examples of scholarship discussing the Black-White paradigm of race, see
John 0. Calmore, Exploring Michael Omi's Messy Real World of Race: An Essay for "Naked
People Longing to Swim Free, 15 LAW AND INEQ. J. 25 (1997); Robert S. Chang, Toward an
Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space,
1 ASIAN L.J. 1 (1994); Adrienne D. Davis, Identity Notes Part One: Playing in the Light, 45
AM. U. L. REV. 695 (1996); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture,
Latino-Critical Scholarship, and the Black-White Binary, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1181 (1997)
[hereinafter Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifteenth Chronicle]; Angela Harris, Foreword: The
Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741 (1994); Chris K. lijima, The Era of We
Construction: Reclaiming the Politics of Asian Pacific American Identity and Reflections in the
Critique of the Black/White Paradigm 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 47, 60 (1997);
Elizabeth Martinez, Beyond Black/White: The Racisms of Our Time, 20 Soc. JUST. 22
(1994); Rachel F. Moran, Neither Black Nor White, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 61 (1997)
[hereinafter Moran, Neither Black Nor White]; Rachel F. Moran, Unrepresented, 55
REPRESENTATIONS' 139 (1996) [hereinafter Moran, Unrepresented]; Rachel F. Moran, What
if Latinos Really Mattered in the Public Policy Debate?, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1315 (1997)
[hereinafter Moran, What If Latinos]; Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm and
The "Normal Science" of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213 (1997) [hereinafter
Perea, Normal Science]; Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution: Beyond the Black and
White Binary Constitution, 36 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 571 (1995) [hereinafter Perea,
Ethnicity and the Constitution]; Ramirez, supra note 25, at 958; William R. Tamayo, When
the "Coloreds" Are Neither Black Nor Citizens: The United States Civil Rights Movement and
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theorists are at this point no more than descriptive and heuristic. 34 In
addition, many purported reconstructions of American racial paradigms
proceed from a false equation of the civil rights model of legal justice and
the Black experience of race.35 Much of this scholarship tends to equate
the civil rights model of legal justice with the aspirations of the African
American civil rights movement itself. These faulty premises lead scholars
to misstate the premises of the civil rights struggle, to underestimate the
movement's benefits to Whites and other non-Whites, and to
prematurely signal the demise of the movement's vision and the disutility
of its legislative product.
Yamamoto does not purport to resolve the debate over the existing
racial paradigm or the contributions of the civil rights model of legal jus-
tice, and the views expressed here will not accomplish that result either.
This essay suggests both further amplification of Yamamoto's guidelines
for critical race praxis and, more importantly, recommends their applica-
tion to the analysis and development of progressive race theory itself. In
Part I, I critique the various models recommended by scholars to replace
the Black-White paradigm and examine aspects of the debate over race
versus ethnic designations. In Part II, I consider various claims that distort
the history and import of the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 60s
and the significance of the civil rights model of legal justice for groups
other than African Americans. In Part III, I apply one of Professor
Yamamoto's guidelines for critical race praxis to the treatment of white-
ness in progressive race theory. Finally, I conclude by retuming to the
view that scholars have focused too much attention on problems of dis-
juncture and insufficiently on the core problem of structural inequality:
the separation of civic and political rights from economic and social ones.
Global Migration, 2 ASIAN L.J. 1 (1995); Frank H. Wu, Neither Black Nor White: Asian
Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225 (1995).
34. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 5, at 853-55.
35. See, e.g., Moran, Unrepresented, supra note 33, at 142 ("The civil rights model in
the United States is clearly based on the African American experience."); Perea, Normal
Science, supra note 33, at 1239 ("Within the [Black-White] paradigm, the only facts and
histories that matter are those regarding Whites and Blacks. Therefore, virtually the only
stories we ever learn about civil rights are stories about Blacks and Whites struggling over
civil rights for Blacks.").
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I. RECONSTRUCTING THE DOMINANT PARADIGM OF RACE
A. Inside Black and White
In Beyond Black and White,36 political and social theorist Manning
Marable comments on the "collapsing myth" of unity among various
groups of color. The goal of multicultural democracy is easy to state, but
the challenge of transcending the theoretical and practical limits and
contradictions of a politics of race is far more difficult than progressive
activists and theorists are willing to acknowledge. Obvious differences of
history, culture, and language mediated through the prisms of race, class,
gender, and sexuality, under a dominating ideology of White supremacy
create seemingly insurmountable barriers to a unified attack on
institutionalized racism. To this mix must be added radical actual and
projected increases in the non-White percentage of the U.S. population
occurring in tandem with even more radically increasing racialized
expressions of violence, social destruction and degradation, poverty, and
class inequality. Moreover, conflicting politics of racial identity and
empowerment strategy, exacerbated by intergenerational clashes based on
differences in values and experience, persist within and across groups of
color.37 Compounding these impediments are a radical transformation inour oncptio ofracil •38
our conception of racial categories coupled with a debate about their
continued theoretical and practical utility. 39 In a period of radical social
transformation, scant solid ground exists on which to construct a new
social ideal. Common condition does not lead readily to common
consciousness.
To a large extent, the struggles among non-Whites seem only to
amplify a long tradition of struggle under a binary construction of racial
36. See MARABLE, supra note 7, at 185.
37. For discussions of intergenerational conflict within racialized groups, see Iijima,
supra note 33, at 61-68; CORNEt WEST, RACE MATTERS 14-18 (1993); Paulette Caldwell,
Dread Heads: Roles, Models, and the Black Voice in Mainstream News, 18 PARAGRAPH 13
(1995).
38. See generally Sharon M. Lee, Racial Classifications in the U.S. Census: 1890-1990,
16 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUD. 75 (1993) (analyzing changes in the meaning of race in
U.S. society from 1890 to 1990); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES FROM THE 1960's TO THE 1980's 3-4, 145-46 (1991)
(discussing the impact of census classifications on the politics of racial identity).
39. See Ian F. Haney-Lopez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race to LatCrit
Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1179-88 (1997) (summarizing the debate among scholars
regarding the salience of race as a category and calling for the rejection of racial language).
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conflict represented in terms of Black and White. Yamamoto's focus on
the racial politics employed in contemporary civil rights litigation also
points to a central weakness in a competitive model of group empower-
ment, a weakness which does not disappear and which may be
exacerbated in the competition among non-White groups. Racism is
about race: more races can lead both to changes in the way racism is pre-
sented, and ultimately to more, rather than less, racism. A competitive
model leads inevitably to a zero-sum framework which overshadows
commonalities and emphasizes and reinscribes differences, hostilities, and,
ultimately, continued subordination.' To the point, this model does
nothing to decenter "whiteness" and other notions of racial hierarchy and
supremacy or to promote the goal which Yamamoto argues progressive
theorists share: "the elimination or diminution of the material, real-world
conditions of racial oppression," an essential component of a progressive
definition of racial justice.42
A competitive model of individual and group empowerment is not
inherent in the struggle for justice, but progressive theorists do not nec-
essarily abandon it when proposing reconstructions of the existing racial
binary. Most agree that a Black-White model of racial conflict plays an
important role in blinding racial and ethnic subordinates to the particularsof teir hare . • 43
of their shared condition. Yet much of what passes for critique of the
Black-White construction of race does little more than substitute alterna-
tive binary or other constructions for the existing dominant paradigm
without attending to the consequences of these reconstructions for the
ultimate goal of ending racial subordination. Much of the emerging
scholarship challenging the prevailing paradigm does so only by articu-
lating the claims of other subordinates in comparison with African
40. See Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 5, at 821-28 (describing cases and
controversies involving conflicts among subordinated racial groups which employ ideas
refined by neoconservative race scholars).
41. See id. at 861-62. Professor Derrick Bell suggests that this competition is exacer-
bated in times of conservative retrenchment. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT
SAVED 5 (1987). A number of scholars have addressed this aspect of interminority group
justice claims. See, e.g., Lisa Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African
American/Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed Los Angeles, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
901 (1995); Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Other Against Itself. Deconstructing the Violent
Discourse Between Korean and African Americans, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 15 (1993); Charles R.
Lawrence Ill, Foreword: Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47
STAN. L. REV. 819 (1995).
42. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 5, at 831.
43. For descriptions of the limits of the Black-White paradigm, see Calmore, supra
note 33, at 58-60; lijima, supra note 33, at 68-74.
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Americans, on the one hand, and dominant Whites on the other. 4 Such
articulations, nevertheless, play a crucial role in racial justice projects: they
provide a much-needed and more complete understanding of the opera-
tion of White supremacy in the subordination of each individual as well
as all racialized groups. Yet a singular focus on the deconstruction of the
most common representation of the existing racial paradigm, unhinged
from an express commitment to a broadly transformative antisubordina-
tion vision that benefits all-including Whites4s--easily intensifies the
focus on particularized circumstances which Yamamoto decries. The de-
construction of a paradigm of race, which standing alone contributes to
interracial disharmony, may actually become an engine of racial discord.
The dynamics within much of progressive race scholarship mirror the
dynamics Professor Yamamoto criticizes in contemporary civil rights liti-
46gation involving multiple racial groups.
44. See Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifteenth Chronicle, supra note 33, at 1189-1200 (describing
the impact of the Black-White paradigm on Latinos); see also Pat K. Chew, Asian Ameri-
cans: The "Reticent" Minority and their Paradoxes, 36 WM & MARY L. REV. 1, 47-54 (1994)
(describing the employment conditions of Asian Americans in professional occupations).
Professor Chew does compare Asian Americans to groups other than African Americans
and Whites, such as Latinos. However, using population/workforce statistics (arguably the
most general and, therefore, least reliable comparison), she does note in particular the
relative positions of Asian and African Americans in certain professions: "In some cases,
such as with public administrators and officials, psychologists, counselors and teachers, and
directors and actors, the under-representation of Asian Americans is more extreme than
the under-representation of African Americans." Id. at 48-49 (footnote omitted).
45. See Calmore, supra note 33, at 80 (commenting on the goal of empowering the
whole of American humanity). Calmore further argues:
Whites must do more than merely take a counter-stance to white su-
premacy. They must also engage in renegotiating the dominant culture in
a way that "whiteness" becomes enough of a color so that a multicultural
nation would include them as people of color, as another "border identity"
that would "constitute a bold infringement on normalcy" and help to
create a new consciousness of the borderlands-a mestiza consciousness
.... [T]hese new colored whites would join with colored non-whites to
make one glorious mess of race and ethnicity. It may be the only way to
move us out of the mess we are in now.
Id. (quoting Peter McLaren, White Terror and Oppositional Agency: Towards a Critical Mul-
ticulturalism, in MULTICULTURALIsM 45 (David Theo Goldberg ed., 1994)).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 11-15.
[VOL. 5:53
9The Content of Our Characterizations
1. Separate-but-Equal Binaries
Anthropologist Roger Sanjek offers six alternative scenarios to cap-
ture the possibilities of racial orderings for the twenty-first century.47
These scenarios do not exhaust the possibilities for the future, but they
provide a useful backdrop for analyzing emerging reconstructions of the
dominant Black-White frame of social and legal analysis. Legal and other
scholars often reconstruct the Black-White paradigm implicitly by creat-
ing multiple, competing, separate-but-equal binary constructions of race
with a different subordinated group on the bottom and Whites on the
top-for example, an Asian-White or a Latino-White binary.48 A varia-
tion of this model focuses on language, citizenship status, immigration
politics, and "perpetual foreignness," and it combines African Americans
and dominant Whites into one dominator group sometimes referred
to as "Anglos." 4 9 (This variation reflects some aspects of the traditional
47. Professor Sanjek notes that the following scenarios are not mutually exclusive and
"each may portend a glimpse of one aspect of our future. There are good reasons to ex-
pect that each of these alternatives simultaneously will find advocates and supporters as the
nation passes into the twenty-first century." Roger Sanjek, Intermarriage and the Future of
Races in the United States, in RAcE 103, 116 (Gregory and Sanjek eds., 1994).
Scenario one--a social order in which racial groups compete and contend for rela-
tive political advantage; Scenario two-people-of-color unity among black, Hispanic, and
Asian groups; Scenario three-transition from a White-Black racial order to a light-dark
order in which Asians and some Hispanics align with Whites; Scenario four-increasing
use of a racially mixed identification, even to the point of a "mixed" U.S. census racial
category, as some already urge; Scenario five-Latin American-styled views of race as
appearance, not ancestry, may gain ascendance; and Scenario six-a people-of-all-colors
ideology promoting unity among working- and lower-middle-class persons, and identi-
fying their class enemies. See id. at 116-21.
48. See, e.g., Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifteenth Chronicle, supra note 33, at 1199 (arguing
that cultural stereotypes about Latinos are more devastating than those about Blacks);
Chew, supra note 44, at 1 (describing social and economic indicators where Whites and
Blacks exceed Asian Americans).
49. See Drucilla Cornell & William W. Bratton, Deadweight Costs and Intrinsic Wrongs
of Nativism: Economics, Freedom, and Legal Suppression of Spanish, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 595,
599 (1999) (defining English-speaking Americans as "Anglos"); Tamayo, supra note 33, at
1-3 (praising Latino and Asian American civil rights organizations for their advocacy on
behalf of immigrants and criticizing the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights for their
equivocation and failure in this regard, and describing specifically a Black-immigrant con-
flict within a broader anti-immigrant national sentiment). Professor Moran notes:
Despite the racial overtones in the immigration debate, civil rights or-
ganizations have sometimes been reluctant to ally themselves with
immigrant rights organizations. For example, when Congress was consid-
ering employer sanctions for hiring undocumented workers, immigrant
advocates argued that the penalties would lead to discrimination against
Latino and Asian workers legally present in the United States. According
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Black-White binary: Asian and Latino/a Americans are collapsed into the
White category such that African Americans appear to be the only or the
principal victims of racism.) In other binaries, another group is added to
each side of the equation, creating, for example, a binary consisting of
African Americans and Latino/as as dominated, and Whites and Asian
Americans as dominators. so This construction may reflect an attempt to
capture the class implications of racial subordination but does so imper-
fectly by leaving out poor Asian Americans and poor Whites. Still others,
apparently focused on color--standing alone or in combination with
class-imply a Black/non-Black or light/dark reconstruction in which
Asian Americans and some Latinos combine with Whites to form an ex-
panded White majority. This latter construction merges with some
interpretations of the existing paradigm which effectively treat everyone
who is not Black, however "Black" is defined, as White."1
to this view, employers would play it safe by refusing to hire people of
Latino or Asian ancestry, even when they were citizens or permanent
resident aliens. Rejecting these concerns, the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) testified in support of the
sanctions ....
Moran, Neither Black Nor White, supra note 33, at 83. Professor Moran does recognize that
the NAACP later joined Latino advocates in calling unsuccessfully for repeal of the sanc-
tions. See id.
50. Descriptions of the racial violence in Los Angeles in 1992 following the verdict
in the first Rodney King police brutality trial suggest the emergence of a Latino-
Black/Asian-White binary. See, e.g., MARABLE, supra note 7, at 184; Tamayo, supra note
33; Robinson, supra note 41; Ikemoto, supra note 41.
51. See Leonard M. Baynes, If It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, Why Does Dark-
ness Cast a Longer Discriminatory Shadow than Lightness? An Investigation and Analysis of the
Color Hierarchy, 75 DENV. U. L. R-Ev. 131 (1997) (describing a dark-light binary that cuts
across racial and ethnic classifications); see also Roger Sanjek, supra note 47, at 117
(suggesting among six alternative scenarios for future racial orderings a "transition from a
white-black racial order to a light-dark order in which Asians and some Hispanics align
with whites."). Sanjek also describes a scenario in which Latin American-styled views of
race as appearance may emerge. Commenting on the European, African, and American
Indian mixed ancestry of many Latinos, Sanjek notes that:
Racial terms translatable as "white," "black," or "Indian," refer to ap-
pearance, not beliefs about absence or presence of African or American
Indian ancestry. In addition, other terms exist to identify persons of in-
termediate combinations of skin color, hair form, and facial features,
much as white Americans distinguish blonds, brunets, or redheads, and
pale to olive-skinned complexions.
Id. at 120 (citations omitted). He notes further, however, that "[c]enturies of white racial
dominance are reflected in continuing notions that light skin, straight hair, and European
facial features are prestigious, but families and kinship networks include persons who vary
widely in racial physiognomy." Id.
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Progressive scholars, in the course of deconstructing the dominant
racial paradigm, often reorganize it but do not necessarily reject its un-
derlying bipolarity. The result of all such reconstructions is that we are
left with multiple, competing, binary constructions of race. Few capture
with any reasonable accuracy the actual experience of racism for all
groups or provide any credible analysis of existing and projected demo-
graphic changes in the U.S. population. 2 They also typically fail to
engage many of the effects of racism either standing alone or intersecting
with other bases of subordination 3
52. Most scholars note the current and projected demographic changes in the U. S.
population, and, without more, proceed to offer alternatives to the Black-White framing
of race relations. But Sanjek argues:
Political readings of various projections of future racial composition-the
percentages of whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians in given cities, states,
or the nation--do not take into account the trends of intermarriage, the
nature of racial identification of mixed persons, or the significance of in-
termarriage within kinship networks.
Sanjek, supra note 47, at 116. He argues further:
The white population increasingly may divide into two groups. The first
will be those "Americans" who admit to no ethnicity, continue to prac-
tice racial exclusion, and define fewer and fewer U.S. residents as white.
The second will consist of those whites who, along with persons of other
and mixed racial identities, maintain social ties and practice politics that
increasingly discount race, and that accord ethnicity across today's racial
boundaries. This second grouping will have its conservative and progres-
sive elements, dividing on issues we may now not easily predict.
Id. at 121.
Sanjek provides an example of how this new ethnicity may operate. He describes
the comments of Peter Chema, a White city council member in the City of Yonkers who
fought the 1985 order issued by Federal District Court Judge Leonard Sand that the City
of Yonkers erect new low-income housing in White neighborhoods to remedy historic
housing segregation aimed at Blacks.
[Chema] objected to being called a racist, protesting, "I live in an inte-
grated building in an integrated neighborhood. My wife is a minority.
My brother-in-law is a minority." His wife is Filipino, and his brother-
in-law is Peruvian. Chema also teaches martial arts at the Yonkers Chi-
nese Community Center and has appeared in a Kung-fu movie. He
exemplifies racism with a multicultural face.
Id. at 122.
In the end, then, the critical racial issue will continue to be the place that persons
of African descent occupy within the U.S. social order.
53. Many progressive scholars have addressed the phenomenon of racism intersecting
with other bases of discrimination. For race-gender discussions, see Regina Austin, Sap-
phire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. Rv. 539 (1989); Caldwell, A Hairpiece, supra note 29; Barbara
Christian, Camouflaging Race and Gender, 55 REPRESENTATIONS 120 (1996); Kimberl6
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2. The Rise of Exceptionalist Claims
Scholars describing the distinct history and effects of racism on par-
ticular racialized groups generally disclaim any intention to create an
oppression sweepstakes or race to the bottom, but often the framework of
their narratives negates this contention. 54 By focusing selectively on the
social and economic indicators which make one such group as bad or
worse off than another and by developing general claims of exceptional-
ism, 55a competitive model of group empowerment is reinforced. More
often than not, the selected indicators do not demonstrate in toto the po-
sitions of racialized groups relative to each other so much as they
demonstrate the differential operation of White supremacy in an over-
arching system of subordination. Many scholars fail either to recognize or
acknowledge an underlying feature of racialization processes: the creation
of a series of surface distinctions that alternately demonize one group and
idealize another in much the same way that the dominant racial paradigm
pits Blacks and Whites against each other. The result is a one-up-one-
down game where each stigmatized group at some point gets to be on
the bottom under all others in society. As Professor Yamamoto recog-
nizes, all bipolar racial constructions fail to account either for this process
or for the interminority group conflicts that are masked by a simplistic
framework of a single dominator group over a dominated one.
5 6
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Anti-
discrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHIc. LEGAL F. 139
(1989); Harris, supra note 29, at 581; Laura Padilla, Intersectionality and Positionality: Situat-
ing Women of Color in the Affirmative Action Dialogue, 66 FORD. L. REV. 843 (1997). For
race-class discussions, see Roy L. Brooks, Racial Subordination Through Formal Equal Op-
portunity, 25 SAN DIEcO L. REV. 81 (1988); Richard Walker, California's Collision of Race
and Class, 55 REPRESENTATIONS 163 (1996). For race-sexual orientation discussion, see
Robert Chang and Jerome Culp, Jr., Nothing and Everything: Race, Romer, and
(Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual) Rights, 6 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 229 (1997). For a dis-
cussion of the intersection of multiple factors, see Ruth Colker, Bi: Race, Sexual
Orientation, Gender and Disability, 56 OHIo ST. L.J. 1 (1995).
54. See Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar, supra note 29, at 1199 (arguing that cultural
stereotypes about Latinos are worse than those about Blacks); Chew, supra note 44, at 54
(describing social and economic indicators where Blacks exceed Asians but leaving out
areas where Asians exceed Blacks); Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution, supra note 33, at
571-72 (limiting his arguments about the Constitution's limited protection of ethnicity to
"other" Americans, namely, Latinos and Asian Americans).
55. For a discussion of the rise of exceptionalist claims, see Leslie Espinoza and
Angela P. Harris, Embracing the Tar-Baby: LatCrit Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85
CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1594-1604 (1997).
56. See Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 5, at 851-65 (describing the inade-
quacy of the Black-White paradigm in dealing with interminority group conflicts).
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Two examples of competing exceptionalist claims illustrate these
competitive dynamics: "perpetual foreignness" and slavery. Treating ra-
cialized individuals as perpetual foreigners is one example of a central
feature of racialization processes. Curiously, many scholars seize upon this
idea to distinguish the effects of racialization on certain groups, such as
Asian and Latino Americans, in comparison not only with dominant
White ethnics but also with African Americans. 7 Similarly, others focus
on the percentage of other non-Whites in the United States who are
noncitizens. s8 With respect to both of these indicators-perpetual for-
eignness and citizenship status-African Americans, as much as Whites,
become principal dominators of other racialized groups.
Such comparisons overlook the historic treatment of African
Americans as fundamentally unassimilable into the American social,
economic, and political polity. 9 African American immigrants are also
57. See Neil Gotanda, "Other Non-Whites" in American Legal History: A Review of
Justice at War, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1186, 1188 (1985) (reviewing PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT
WAR (1983)). Gotanda states:
While in legal history the discussion of race has usually meant analysis of
the legal condition of Blacks, I suggest an examination of non-Black ra-
cial minorities-"Other non-Whites"--as a distinct mode of analysis.
One of the critical features of legal treatment of Other non-Whites has
been the inclusion of a notion of "foreignness" in considering their racial
identity and legal status.
Id.
58. See Moran, Neither Black Nor White, supra note 33, at 79 (describing the extent of
Mexican immigration into the United States between 1940 and 1992 and noting that
only a little over 10% entered as permanent resident aliens); Moran, Unrepresented, supra
note 33 (noting the insignificant numbers of immigrants of African descent).
59. See DERRICK BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS: PSALMS OF SURVIVAL IN AN ALIEN LAND
CALLED HOME (1996)-(essays describing the historic and continuing alienation of African
Americans in American society). Professor Juan Perea comments on Toni Morrison's
description of Blacks as America's "real aliens:"
Morrison describes the hatred of Blacks as the defining, final, necessary
step in the Americanization of immigrants. "It is the act of racial con-
tempt [banishing a competing black shoe-shiner] that transforms this
charming Greek into an entitled white." Morrison sees Blacks as persis-
tently victimized by Americanizing processes, always forced to "the
lowest level of the racial hierarchy." The struggles of immigrants, ac-
cording to Morrison, 'are persistently framed as struggles between recent
arrivals and blacks. In race talk the move into mainstream America always
means buying into the notion of American blacks as the real aliens.
Whatever the ethnicity or nationality of the immigrant, his nemesis is
understood to be African American.'
Perea, Normal Science, supra note 33, at 1230 (interpreting Toni Morrison, On the Backs of
Blacks, reprinted in ARGUING IMMIGRATION 97 (Nicholaus Mills ed., 1994)).
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treated differently than White imimigrants, notwithstanding their
relatively small numbers in relation to current numbers of Asian and
Latino immigrants. 60 Few would dispute that African American citizens
Morrison is right that American "Whiteness" is often achieved through
distancing from Blacks. Latinos/as participate in the paradigm by engag-
ing in racism against Blacks or darker-skinned members of Latino/a
communities. Current events belie, however, Morrison's notion of
American Blacks as "the real aliens." Mexican and other Latino/a and
Asian aliens have become targets of state and federal legislation denying
them medical and educational resources."
Id. at 1230. Without privileging either Morrison's or Perea's account-indeed there is
truth in both-Professor Perea makes my point. There is enough "perpetual foreignness"
and alienage talk to stigmatize each and every racialized group.
60. Professor Moran argues that Latinos are trapped between a civil rights model and
an immigration model of empowerment, neither of which accurately reflects Latino his-
tory and experience of racism. She notes further:
Even today, the African American community is defined primarily in ra-
cial terms; a small influx of African and Caribbean immigrants has not
altered the perception that Blacks are mainly the descendants of slaves.
America's fascination with the charismatic General Colin Powell exem-
plifies this monolithic racial understanding of Blacks. When the media
labeled General Powell as the first Black with the potential to become
President, he politely pointed out that he was the descendant ofJamaican
immigrants and thought of himself as such. Nevertheless, the press con-
tinued to refer to him as a Black who had broken through the race
barrier to become a Presidential frontrunner.
Moran, Neither Black Nor White, supra note 33, at 69.
However, Professor Moran does not examine the extent to which Blacks, too, are
trapped between a civil rights model and an immigration model, neither of which reflects
their experiences. The experiences of Amadou Diallo and Abner Louima with police
brutality in the City of New York illustrates their treatment as Blacks, not as immigrants,
and confirms Professor Moran's point. But the treatment of Haitian immigrants seeking
political asylum in comparison with others seeking similar refuge in the United States and
of the Cuban "boat people," most of whom were clearly of African descent, in compari-
son with earlier White Cuban immigrants, demonstrates the differential treatment of
Black immigrants.
Professor Lolita Buckner Inniss describes the Black American experience, before
and during slavery to the present, as an immigrant experience. See Lolita Buckner Inniss,
Tricky Magic: Blacks as Immigrants and the Paradox of Foreignness, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 301,
301 (1999). Commenting also on the media's treatment of General Colin Powell, Inniss
perceives the transmission of a different symbol than Moran's Black racial monolith. Inniss
describes how the apparent success of some Caribbean Black immigrants, of which Gen-
eral Powell is the paradigmatic example, has been used by American Whites to prove that
native Blacks lack the drive and commitment to hard work that an immigration model
presupposes. See id. at 340. Moreover, she defines how, for many Black immigrants, the
"immigrant dream," exemplified by General Powell, leads them to expect a continuation
of the economic success and middle and upper middle-class lifestyles they enjoyed in their
home countries. However, often their experience quickly becomes "an immigrant
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are subjected to continuing denial of the benefits of first-class
citizenshp,61 but few appreciate the extent to which the experiences and
protest movements of African Americans have defined the meaning of
citizenship itself.
62
Exceptionalist claims based on foreignness appear to collide with
Black exceptionalism, in particular the African American experience with
slavery and its aftermath, but the two claims are joined in critical respects.
Scholars acknowledge the importance of slavery to the African American
experience. But by limiting its effects to African Americans and no others
and centering it in the United States, they prove too much and too little.
Just as all racialized groups are treated in some respect as perpetually for-
eign, the experience of slavery and its aftermath affect and belong to all
nightmare," exemplified by the story of Colin Ferguson, an upper middle-class Jamaican
immigrant who experienced the same racism in the United States as any other Black
person. Ferguson killed and wounded several commuters on the Long Island Railroad.
Ferguson represented himself in a trial which, more so than the O.J. Simpson murder
trial, was truly "the trial of the century."
61. See BELL, supra note 59, at 5-11 (describing the worsening economic and social
conditions for Blacks).
62. See Arthur Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RUT. L. REv.
387, 389 (1967) (arguing that African American struggles have defined American citizen-
ship):
That the achievement of this objective [the constitutional objective of
Black freedom] required the construction of a surrounding and protect-
ing fabric of further constitutional guarantees, including the new
prohibitions against the denial by a state of any citizen's right to due
process of law or the equal protection of the laws of that state, was the
first manifestation of an extraordinary phenomenon in American consti-
tutional history-the catalyzing role of efforts to achieve the
constitutional goal of Negro freedom upon the creation of new concepts
and doctrines affecting the interests of all citizens.
Id.
Professor Kinoy continues to define the "catalyzing effect of the myriad forms of
struggle for Negro freedom and equality upon the development of constitutional rights
and liberties applicable to all citizens," including the rise of distinct rights such as the ex-
tension of the doctrine of First Amendment vagueness, freedom of association, and the
right to counsel:
It is the opinion of this author that this is no coincidence-that the pe-
culiar and special conditions underlying the growth of American society
explain why the struggles to eliminate the remaining pervasive influences
of the institution of human slavery are inextricably linked to the efforts to
broaden the base of constitutional liberties for all citizens, and to defend
those already achieved.
Id. at n.6; see also ORLANDO PATTERSON, FREEDOM IN THE MEANING OF WESTERN CUL-
TURE (1991) (arguing that slavery in Western societies gave rise to the centrality of the
ideal of freedom).
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who enter the United States, by birth or otherwise, citizen and nonciti-
zen alike. At the same time, a singular focus on slavery limits the Black
experience to slavery and places it primarily within the borders of the
United States. 63 Like the experiences of other non-Whites, the Black
experience is global in dimension. Scholars arguing on behalf of other
non-Whites have demonstrated the powerful connections between race
64
relations in the United States and international relations. They add an
important dimension to recent articulations of progressive race theory,
but the intellectual power and reach of their arguments is not unique and
65
not new.
63. See Martinez, supra note 33, at 27-28. Martinez argues that the Black/White
framework grows out of a White political culture dominated by a U.S. self-centeredness
that "lacks any global vision other than relations of domination. In particular, the U.S. has
consistently demonstrated contempt for Latin America .... The U.S. refuses to see itself
as one nation sitting on a continent with 20 others .... That myopia has surely nurtured
the Black/white framework for racism." Id.
64. See Espinoza & Harris, supra note 55, at 1630 ("A LatCrit focus on Latin Amer-
ica, South America, Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean, and the relationship of
these countries with the United States makes possible an analysis that joins together do-
mestic 'race relations' with international relations.").
65. See DAVID L. LEWIS, W.E.B. DuBois: BIOGRAPHY OF A RACE, 1868-1919 251
(1993). Lewis describes the rise of Pan-Africanism, beginning in 1899, and quoting
DuBois' closing address, "To the Nations of the World," delivered at the first meeting of
the Pan African Congress in London in 1900: "In the metropolis of the modem world, in
this closing year of the nineteenth century, there has been assembled a congress of men
and women of African blood, to deliberate solemnly upon the present situation and out-
look of the darker races of mankind." DuBois' better known speech, defining color as the
critical issue for the twentieth century, delivered twenty-five years after the first meeting
of the Pan African Congress, is presumed to be addressed to racism in the United States.
A more complete rendition of the text reveals, however, that not only did DuBois refer
to international dimensions of racism, but he also utilized a paradigm not limited solely to
Black and White:
[T]he problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour
line, the question as to how far differences of race .. .are going to be
made, hereafter, the basis of denying to over half the world the right of
sharing to their utmost ability the opportunities and privileges of modem
civilization. To be sure, the darker races are today the least advanced in
culture according to European standards. This has not, however, always
been the case in the past, and certainly the world's history, both ancient
and modem, has given many instances of no despicable ability and capac-
ity among the blackest races of men. In any case, the modem world must
need remember that in this age ... millions of black men in Africa,
America, and the Islands of the Sea, not to speak of the brown and yel-
low myriads else where, are bound to have great influence upon the
world in the future, by reason of sheer numbers and physical contact ...
If, by reason of carelessness, prejudice, greed and injustice, the black
world is to be exploited and ravished and degraded, the results must be
deplorable, if not fatal, not simply to them, but to the high ideals ofjus-
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Without making such a claim, Professor Angela Harris lays out the
contours of the claim for Black exceptionalism in response to particular
attacks on the Black-White paradigm. 66 In a colloquy with Professor
tice, freedom, and culture which a thousand years of Christian civiliza-
tion have been held before Europe.
Id. at 251.
Manning Marable describes the international dimensions of racism during the
Reagan administration:
An explicitly racist aspect of the Reagan agenda manifested itself domes-
tically and internationally. Black workers suffered disproportionately from
both unemployment and social-service reductions .... In its foreign af-
fairs, the Reagan administration authorized a policy of 'constructive
engagement' with apartheid South Africa. In 1981, Reagan asked Con-
gress to repeal the Clark amendment prohibiting covert military aid to
Angolan terrorists; authorized the U.S. training of South Africa's Coast
Guard; and vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning South
Africa's illegal invasion of Angola. In 1982 the Reagan administration
rescinded controls on "non-lethal" exports to apartheid's military and
police; voted for a $1.1 billion loan from the International Monetary
Fund to South Africa; sent 2,500 electric-shock batons to the South Afri-
can police; and appointed a pro-apartheid U.S. executive, Herman
Nickel, ambassador to Pretoria. The next year, the administration estab-
lished offices in downtown Johannesburg to promote accelerated U.S.
investment in the regime, and granted a license for U.S. firms to service
South Africa's Koeberg nuclear power plant. By 1984 about 6,350 U.S.
corporations held direct subsidiaries or did some form of business inside
the racist regime. U.S. firms supplied 15 per cent of the state's imports,
and absorbed 8 per cent of its exports, amounting to $4 billion.
MARABLE, supra note 7, at 26.
66. See MARABLE, supra note 7, at 26-27; Espinoza & Harris, supra note 55, at 1596-
1605. Professor Harris states:
The argument for black exceptionalism is usually not articulated in mixed
company in the interests of interracial solidarity. I have set out the argu-
ment, not because I believe it to be right, but because I believe that
Perea's direct challenge to the black-white paradigm and the power and
promise of LatCrit theory more generally forces it into the open. The
claim of black exceptionalism presents both an intellectual and a political
challenge to LatCrit theory. As an intellectual claim, black exceptionalism
answers Perea's criticism of the black-white paradigm by responding that
the paradigm, though wrongly making "other nonwhites" invisible,
rightly places black people at the center of any analysis of American cul-
ture or American white supremacy. In its strongest form, black
exceptionalism argues that what "white" people have done to "black"
people is at the heart of the story of America: indeed, the story of "race"
itself is the story of the construction of blackness and whiteness. In this
story, Indians, Asian Americans, and Latino/as do exist. But their roles
are subsidiary to, rather than undermining, the fundamental binary na-
tional drama. As a political claim, black exceptionalism exposes the deep
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Leslie Espinoza, Harris does not root her description of the Black
experience in slavery; perhaps by design, she rarely mentions it directly.
Harris argues that a claim for Black exceptionalism is based on two
supports: ". . . the historic and continuing centrality of African American
ethnicity to American political and social life; and ... the centrality of
anti-black racism to the patterns of domination we call white
,,67
supremacy.
A direct reference to slavery and its equivalence to Black exception-
alism appears in Professor Espinoza's account of the critical role of
narrative scholarship, and she refers to slavery in order to place it in op-
68position to claims of other non-Whites to perpetual foreignness. Like
Professor Espinoza, Professor Harris also places the Black experience of
slavery in opposition to the "foreignness" of others, and she does so in
support of an argument regarding the centrality of the Black experience
to American political and social identity:
Native Americans are thought to have vanished long ago,
leaving behind only their noble spirituality for non-Indians
to admire and appropriate at will. Asian Americans and La-
tinos are imagined as eternal "strangers," people who carry
the border of American territorial power and cultural integ-
rity within them. But African Americans, for all our talk
about Mother Africa, are profoundly and unmistakably
Americans. More to the point, Americans are distinctively
African.69
Yet other parts of Professor Harris' narrative make clear that African
Americans have experienced an exclusion in terms of a certain kind of
mistrust and tension among American ethnic groups racialized as
"nonwhite."
Id. at 1603.
67. Espinoza & Harris, supra note 55, at 1596.
68. See id. at 1635. Professor Espinoza states:
The "immigrant" aspect of racial oppression is not equivalized in the tra-
ditional black/white racial paradigm. African Americans know which side
of the border they are on. African American exceptionalism-and I agree
with Angela [Harris] that there is an exceptionalism-is more tied to
slavery. There is, however Chicano/a exceptionalism. Like Native
Americans, we are colonized. Unlike Native Americans, we have not
had the symbolic recognition of our original sovereignty. I worry that
this identity will be forgotten.
Id.
69. Id. at 1596-97 (citations omitted).
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foreignness akin to that of other non-Whites.70 African American claims
to the "borderlands" do not rest on geography; rather, they "embody the
nigger in the American imagination: a creature at the border of the hu-
man and the bestial, a being whose human form only calls attention to its
subhuman nature.
7 1
My point is not to trivialize the claims of either African Americans
or other non-Whites to differential racialization, or to privilege one ac-
count over another, or even to establish false equivalencies where none
exist. Difference among racialized groups are real, but so are commonali-
ties, such as the dominant paradigm's influence on the racial construction
of groups and their relationships to each other.72 Rather, I want to point
to the purpose and effect of differential racialization itself in perpetuating
competition among racialized others. I also want to suggest that a com-
monality underlies the various exceptionalist claims and all forms of
racism, one which the scholarship on reordering the existing racial para-
digm understates in its attempt to distinguish historic expressions of
70. Some argue that the alienation of Blacks is greater than the foreignness of others.
See Martinez, supra note 33, at 28. Martinez describes the culture of color in the United
States:
The relatively light skin and "Caucasian" features of many Latinos mean
they are less threatening in the eyes of white racism and can even
"pass"-unnoticed, invisible-much more often than African Americans.
Obviously this carries certain advantages in a racist society. Many Latinos
would like to pass, work hard to assimilate, and succeed.
Id.
Describing the psychological implications of the Black-White paradigm, Martinez
quotes Robert Blauner:
We buy black writers, not only because they can write and have some-
thing to say, but because the white racial mind is obsessed with blackness
... Mexican-Americans, on the other hand, have been unseen as indi-
viduals and as a group ... James Baldwin has pointed to the deep mutual
involvement of black and white in America. The profound ambivalence,
the love-hate relationship, which Baldwin's own work expresses and
dissects, does not exist in the racism that comes down on LaRaza ...
Even the racial stereotypes that plague Mexican-Americans tend to lack
those positive attributes that mark antiblack fantasies--supersexuality, in-
born athletic and musical power, natural rhythm. Mexicans are dirty,
lazy, treacherous, thieving bandits--and revolutionaries.
Id. (quoting ROBERT BLAUNER, RACIAL OPPRESSION IN AMERICA 163-64 (1972)).
71. Espinoza & Harris, supra note 55, at 1601.
72. See id. (arguing both in favor of "strategic essentialism" and against exaggerated
commonality among people of color).
73. Professor Espinoza riotes that liberation need not be a zero-sum game, and others
need to heed her observation. See id. at 1643.
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racism from its contemporary mutations. 4 Finally, the emergence of any
exceptionalist claim brings into play other exceptionalisms and calls up a
competition among them. Professor Espinoza's questions are telling:
[w]ho is more 'exceptional'? When we ask that question,
we are buying into the hierarchical system that oppresses us.
Latino/as are seen as immigrant interlopers; blacks are seen
as intractable criminals. Does it really matter if resistance is
met with deportation or with imprisonment? The important
questions are: "What is the nature of our oppression? Who
benefits by it? And, how can we resist?
5
3. Restorying the Black-White Paradigm
I would be satisfied with Professor Espinoza's questions were it not
for another important dimension of our struggles to articulate a more
complete statement of American racism. Again, I will use slavery, not for
74. See DAVID GOLDBERG, ANATOMY OF RACISM (1990). Goldberg argues that racism
lacks any single, permanent or fixed characteristics and that new forms are born out of
global events, in particular the new international division of labor:
[A]lI forms of racism may be linked in terms of their exclusionary or in-
clusionary undertakings. A major historical shift has been from past racist
forms defining and fueling expansionist colonial aims and pursuits to
contemporary expressions in nationalist terms. Insistence on racial inferi-
ority in the past fed colonial appetites and imperialist self-definition.
Racism is taken now to be expressed increasingly in terms of isolationist
nationalist self-image; of cultural differentiation tied to custom, tradition,
and heritage; and of exclusionary inmigration policies, anti-immigrant
practices and criminality.
Id. at xiv.
Professor Harris, on the other hand, appears to suggest a differential racism in the
form of nativism which affects non-Whites other than Blacks. "From a global perspective,
the perpetuation of nativist racism puts American whites and blacks into collusion against
foreign, nonwhite Others." Espinoza & Harris, supra note 55, at 1639. At the same time
she suggests African American interest in a reordered racial paradigm:
African Americans also have an interest in recognizing a larger geopoliti-
cal context for white supremacy. For instance, to the extent that African
Americans are concerned about Africa and its relations with the West, it
is necessary to understand that white supremacy is not solely a domestic
phenomenon, but is inextricable from the colonial practices that gave it
birth.
Id. (citation omitted). I agree that all subordinated groups have an interest in the world-
wide dimensions of White supremacy, but I differ from Professor Harris by recognizing
the effects of nativist racism on African Americans in the first instance. See infra n.102.
75. Espinoza & Harris, supra note 55, at 1635-36.
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its exceptional quality, but as an example of the risks of an insufficiently
nuanced account of the Black-White paradigm and its reconstructions
and the potential of the paradigm critique to coalesce with neoconserva-
tive theory and praxis.
Professor Espinoza powerfully employs the term "restorying" to re-
fer to the use and importance of narrative to deconstruct and reorder the
dominant racial paradigm . This retelling in large part defines the project
of the progressive scholarship discussed in this essay; it is essential to the
process of uncovering many of the negative consequences of the opera-
tion of the Black-White paradigm, consequences which are harmful to
Blacks and Whites and to other non-Whites inadequately represented by
it. Professor Espinoza also describes a dynamic process:7 each retelling of
our stories allows us not only to reimagine the future; with "each telling
and retelling, both listener and speaker are better able to construct a
meaning for their own individual life and to sort through false visions of
,,711
our individual stories and of the cultural stories that constrain us.
Professor Espinoza's reference to "our stories" may not convey the
complications involved in telling stories across the boundaries of non-
White experience. We need not tell the same stories. Our stories about
White supremacy will be different from White accounts of whiteness and
different from each other's. However, unless we take great care in the
stories we tell, we stand to undermine the legitimacy of this important
element of progressive race methodology to a far greater extent than any
of our detractors have done heretofore. 7 9 To the extent the ideology of
White supremacy has caused us to be under- , mis- , and mal-educated
about ourselves, we have been similarly educated about each other and
our relationships one to another. While uncovering our specific group
76. See id. at 1631.
77. Professor Harris' response to Professor Espinoza further explains this dynamism:
... [Als Leslie [Espinoza] suggests, the ultimate goal is not telling the
same story over and over again, unchanged. Rather, stories should
change as one tells them, for narratives serve not just as explanations of
the past but as road maps for where we wish to go. And the subject of
the story, as well, should change in the telling. It is important, then, to
acknowledge that the story of black oppression changes in light of the
story of Latino/a oppression, and that the subject of each story-"black
identity" or "Latino/a identity"-itself is constantly changing even in the
process of telling its story.
Id. at 1643.
78. Id. at 1633.
79. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE
RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1998) (attacking use of storytelling in
legal scholarship by feminists and progressive race theorists).
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histories, we need to take account of the history of White supremacy to
avoid undermining the history of others.
Progressive scholars in the legal academy are well aware of Professor
Charles Lawrence's pathbreaking ideas regarding unconscious racism.s°
Other scholars have reinforced the significance of Lawrence's work: since
so much discrimination is motivated by unconscious beliefs and stereo-
types, minority group members and women will be significantly harmed
by unintended, non-malicious discrimination." s The progressive schol-
arship described in this Essay is not motivated by conscious bias. But the
notion of unconscious racism, typically employed to describe relation-
ships among groups in a White-on-Black or dominator-on-dominated
framework, applies with equal force to the relationships among racialized
groups.
Progressive scholarship analyzing the Black-White paradigm of race
often reflects an angry, retributive attitude or tone toward Blacks and
Black scholars: 82 it is now common to hear references to a so-called
"African American franchise on race"8--as if the Black-White paradigm
was created by Blacks--despite the fact that attempts by Blacks to expand
the paradigm have been thwarted by neoconservative forces. 4 Ostensibly
in jest, Blacks are described as "the model minority. 88 This tone may be
the inevitable by-product of the business of uncovering and retelling the
80. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. Rav. 317 (1987).
81. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 921, 946 (1996).
82. See Espinoza & Harris, supra note 55, at 1615.
Professor Perea's article, for example, could be read as a criticism of Afri-
can American scholars-a set piece for Black/brown conflict. Arguably,
Latino/as are asking why Black scholars continually ignore the suffering
of other racial groups. African Americans seem to have bought the fran-
chise on race victimhood and do not want to share the territory of
suffering-and righteous indignation-with other outsider groups.
Id. (responding to Perea, Normal Science, supra note 33).
83. Id. at 1615.
84. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). In Croson, the
Supreme Court used an attempt by the City of Richmond to expand the Black-White
framework of race by including within its minority set aside program other non-Whites
along with Blacks as a reason for striking down that program and, for the first time, ex-
tended strict scrutiny analysis to affirmative action programs.
85. For the most part, comments of this sort seldom find their way into written
expressions of progressive race theory. Professors Espinoza and Harris, supra note 55,
provide a rare insight into the dynamics that increasingly characterize conferences and
other gatherings of progressive scholars.
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story of American racism. Honest reflection will not always be pleasant.8 6
But what may suffice for an initial stage of a movement must not over-
take or become the movement itself.
Professor Yamamoto's call to critical race praxis assumes that theo-
rists have intuitions of theory to impart to practitioners and activists
seeking to resolve interminority group tensions. Theorists cannot answer
this call without also attending to similar tensions among themselves. In
the coalescence of neoconservative theory and praxis, the story of Ameri-
can slavery and its aftermath and similar engines of oppression of other
racialized groups are rapidly being trashed, diminished, and restructured
in the service of contemporary race politics. s7 Our restorying must take
place at the same time but need not cooperate unwittingly with the neo-
88
conservative project.
Sociologist Steven Steinberg addresses the difficulty of ridding social
science of crude, popular ideas about race and ethnicity. He notes that
"opposing these ideological currents is like swimming upstream-one starts
out with a burst of energy, makes some headway, but eventually succumbs
to the unrelenting downstream force." 89 The ideological force of the Black-
White paradigm of race is multidimensional, and it is more entrenched and
more powerful than most scholars are willing to acknowledge. Deconstruc-
tion, detached from an inclusive antisubordination commitment, can be a
'dangerous tool.
Against the weight of history, the commitment to a fair and com-
plete restorying of race cannot be taken for granted. Not only must it be
stated unambiguously, but all aspects of our work must clearly reflect it:
from our descriptions and analyses of differential racialization, demo-
graphic representations, and projections for the population of the future,
to the construction of categories of identity and exceptionalist claims.
86. See Christian, supra note 53, at 125.
87. See DINESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACIsM (1995) (reconstructing the meaning
and import of American slavery for Blacks); ORLANDO PATTERSON, RITUALS IN BLOOD:
CONSEQUENCES OF SLAVERY IN Two AMERICAN CENTURIES (1999) (denouncing the res-
urrection of the idea of stable slave families and adopting and extending a Moynihanesque
description of contemporary Black families); PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON
SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION DISASTER (1995) (arguing that current immigra-
tion patterns, consisting of a large percentage of non-Whites, must be curtailed because
their eligibility for affirmative action will displace Whites in education and employment).
88. See, e.g., discussion infra, Part II, regarding the tendency of progressive scholars to
"restory" the civil rights movement in a way which distorts its aims and accomplishments.
89. STEPHEN STEINBERG, THE ETHNIC MYTH ix (2d ed. 1989).
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B. Of Race and Ethnicity
Professor Yamamoto argues that progressive scholars must abandon
conservative theories of ethnicity, but he does not point to any who do
not. The problem with the debate among progressives over the salience
of race and ethnicity as organizing principles for various groups is more
nuanced than Professor Yamamoto's admonition suggests. Most progres-
sives reject conservative ethnicity theory, but some employ the language
of race and ethnicity in a manner which fails to adequately counter cniti-
cal underpinnings of conservatism. It is possible, therefore, to reject
conservative theory on the one hand but unwittingly reinscribe its tenets
on the other. Arguments pitting race against ethnicity in either conserva-
tive or progressive form have the potential to perpetuate a competitive
model of group empowerment, reinforce biological notions of race, and
define American racism as a bipolar dilemma. Many progressives miss the
essential focus of antisubordination theory and practice by focusing on
differences in racial or ethnic essentialism that do not address directly the
relationship between material conditions of subordination and the ideo-
logical premises on which they rest. For the most part, their failure to
adequately interrogate all elements of conservative ethnicity theory flows
from attributing a power to the Black-White paradigm of race that it
cannot support and from confusing the paradigm with the limits of formal
equality.
1. Race Versus Ethnicity
Professor Perea argues that the focus on race, especially under law,
leaves out significant factors, such as culture, language, and religion, that
• . . 90
are features of ethnic identification. He argues further that race is in-
90. In Perea's words:
[Aipplying a narrow concept of race to Latinos makes no sense. Latinos
constitute a heterogeneous group composed of people of many races and
nationalities but with a high degree of commonality in culture, language,
history and tradition. For this group, equal protection defined narrowly
by race really constitutes little or no protection because much discrimi-
nation suffered by Latinos does not depend on racial difference.
Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution, supra note 33, at 600; see also Moran, Unrepresented,
supra note 33, at 142 (arguing that Latinos are not adequately represented under a civil
rights model based on the Black experience of race: "First, Latinos are not a monolithic
racial group: their ancestors may be white, black, or indigenous peoples."). Professor
Moran describes, without adopting, an ethnic attribution for Latinos. But see Haney-
Lopez, supra note 39 (discussing the limits of ethnicity and arguing for an increased reli-
ance on the language of race to define Latino identity).
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cluded in but not constitutive of ethnicity; as a result, issues of discrimi-
nation unique to ethnic groups escape legal scrutiny and popular
attention.91 This result he attributes directly to the law's focus on race
which has caused the courts to neglect ethnicity and, in addition, has
"encouraged an underinclusive, binary discourse about race in which the
primary views expressed are the white and the African American. ' '92 Pro-
fessor Perea limits the force of his arguments principally to groups such as
Asian Americans and Latinos to the exclusion of Blacks and Whites.93
These arguments focus needlessly on biological notions of race and
attribute them almost exclusively to the Black-White racial paradigm. But
nothing compels this relationship,94 and by continuing to insist on its ex-
istence and by limiting the thrust of his arguments to Latinos and Asian
Americans, Professor Perea reinforces these biological understandings. 9
91. See Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution, supra note 33, at 603:
By focusing exclusively on race, the Court will not recognize, either by
design or through error, many equally pernicious forms of discrimination
because of ethnic traits. The Court's exclusive focus on race, either
broadly or narrowly conceived, reinforces the tendency to consider all
issues of discrimination and racism in the binary terms of only two com-
munities, the African American and the white.
92. Id. at 573; see also Moran, Unrepresented, supra note 33, at 141-42 ("The mixed
message of the civil rights paradigm, which is rooted in the black experience, is that Lati-
nos have been treated similarly to blacks, but in reality they are more like white ethnic
immigrants.").
93. See Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution, supra note 33, at 571-72:
Are there just two Americas, defined by blackness and whiteness, strug-
gling to define some mutual accommodation in society? ... For too
long, the real ethnic complexity of American society has been sub-
merged, hidden by a discussion that counts only race as important and
only black or white as race. What of the rest of us, neither black nor
white, not fitting neatly into either category? ... This essay discusses
"other" Americans, Latinos and Asian Americans among them, and their
treatment under the Constitution.
94. For an argument suggesting that the Supreme Court's notion of race is not bio-
logically based, contrary to what much of progressive race theory asserts, see Donald
Braman, Of Race and Imutability, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1375, 1378-79 (1999).
95. Roger Sanjek comments on two effects of placing ethnicity theory at the center
of analysis of the Black-White paradigm. This formulation "regularly leads to treating
African Americans as merely an exception to processes that affect everyone else, and to
underplaying the historic legal and popular denial of equality accorded to Native, Asian,
and Hispanic Americans." Sanjek, supra note 47, at 109. Professor Rachel Moran ad-
dresses the latter effect of ethnicity theory by pointing out how the Latino experience
differs from the experience of dominant ethnics. However, she notes in passing the ex-
clusion of African Americans from ethnic formulations but does not analyze further the
impact of this exclusion. This failure unwittingly reinforces a Black-White paradigm
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Progressive scholars have long argued under a social constructionist view
of race that racism manifests itself in ways that affect cultural and other
factors typically claimed to be exclusive constituents of ethnicity. 96 This is
so even when cultural and related factors are used to discriminate against
groups traditionally identified by biological notions of race. Such dis-
crimination manifests itself as much by associating sociocultural factors
with biology as by denying the protection of antidiscrimination law be-
cause such factors are not biologically based.
Within traditional legal theory, race and ethnicity are joined in a
framework that denies antidiscrimination protection for any deviation
from dominant norms. To the extent that traditional legal theory fails to
recognize racism that takes the form of discrimination against characteris-
tics attributed to ethnicity under a racial paradigm, nothing suggests that
moving to an ethnic formulation will change this result. Progressive
scholars must acknowledge that ethnicity exists within race as much as
race exists within ethnicity, and the insistence on any coherence or ana-
lytical utility in the distinction between such terms and their unique
effects on subordination is questionable.
Professor Perea admirably critiques the flaws in the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Hernandez v. New York, 97 and he demonstrates that the
Court's failure to accord constitutional significance to discrimination
against jurors on the basis of bilingualism is wrong. But by attributing the
Court's failure to a distinction between race and ethnicity, Professor
Perea elevates the formal equality granted in constitutional law under a
racial paradigm to an undeserved place of honor, and he fails to acknowl-
which acknowledges White (and some "other") but denies Black ethnicity. See Moran,
Neither Black Nor White, supra note 33, at 69-77.
96. See, e.g., Caldwell, A Hairpiece, supra note 29 (critiquing the limitation of antidis-
crimination law to immutable characteristics to the exclusion of historical, sociocultural
associations with racial difference); see also WERNER SOLLORs, THEORIES OF ETHNICITY: A
CLASSICAL READER (1996) (analyzing the scholarly debate regarding the differentiation
between race and ethnicity):
In practice, the distinction between a racial and an ethnic group is some-
times blurred by several facts. Cultural traits are often regarded as genetic
and inherited (e.g., body odor, which is a function of diet, cosmetics, and
other cultural items); physical appearance can be culturally changed (by
scarification, surgery, and cosmetics); and the sensory perception of
physical differences is affected by cultural perceptions of race.
Id. at xxxii (quoting PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE, RACE AND RAcISM: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 10 (1967)); see also Espinoza & Harris supra note 55, at 1624-29 (describing
the "circle" of biology and culture in American racial understandings); Yamamoto, Criti-
cal Race Praxis, supra note 5, at 846-48 (discussing without distinguishing between race
and ethnicity, the law's exclusion of discrimination on the basis of culture).
97. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
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edge the shortfalls of formal equality which are demonstrated by the ma-
terial conditions of subordination. These are shortfalls are of a dimension
sufficient to disembowel any professed legal protection of Blacks under a
narrow, Black-White understanding of race. 98 Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall's warnings about the power and propensity of governmental actors
to hide discrimination behind constructs of neutrality, to which Professor
Perea refers, 99 presage the continuing use of peremptory challenges to
strike members of any and all subordinated groups from juries. This con-
tinuing exclusion, sanctioned by law, does not result from a binary racial
paradigm or constitutional jurisprudence focused on race to the detri-
ment, if not exclusion, of ethnicity. It results from a limited conception
of legal justice based not on African American and White experiences, as
Professor Perea claims, but solely on the experiences of dominant Whites.
Professor Perea would readily acknowledge that race is socially con-
structedj0° but he appears to lose this insight in his arguments about
ethnicity. Rather, he appears to treat the nonbiological features of eth-
nicity as somehow more concrete or "real" than race; they are a given, a
natural formulation that fits some groups but not others. He might well
argue for an expansion of the Supreme Court's notion of race in lieu of a
switch to the language of ethnicity) °1 Limiting ethnic discrimination to
Latinos and Asian Americans-Americans other than Blacks and
98. See Michael J. Raphael and Edward J. Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: Neutral
Explanations Under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 229, 236 (1993)
(arguing that the norm of neutrality renders Batson claims ineffective and harms the
integrity of the judicial system by blatantly condoning discriminatory preemptory
challenges based on facially neutral explanations that are pretexts for discrimination); see
also Bryan A. Stevenson and Ruth E. Friedman, Deliberate Indifference: Judicial Tolerance of
Racial Bias in Criminal Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 509 (1994) (arguing that the
courts are willing to tolerate rampant discrimination and exclusion of minorities from
juries by accepting pretextual justifications).
99. Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution, supra note 33, at 600. "'Any prosecutor can
easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts are ill-equipped to
second-guess those reasons.'" (quoting Justice Marshall's concurrence in Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
100. See Perea, Normal Science, supra note 33, at 1219 n.27.
The idea that knowledge is socially constructed, and therefore both con-
tingent upon the values of a society and highly formative of those values
in subsequent generations, is by now well established as a premise of
critical theory. Writers on the subject of race have established forcefully
that any concept of "race" itself is a highly contingent and mutable social
construction. The understanding of race as a social construction does not
mean that race is not real. It is both real and profoundly determinative of
how we experience our lives and identities.
Id. (citations omitted).
101. See Moran, Unrepresented, supra note 33, at 151 (making just such an argument).
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Whites-reinforces artificial distinctions among subordinated groups to
no avail. It is one thing for Professor Perea to argue that Latinos and
Asian Americans are disproportionately affected by excluding bilingualism
from constitutional protection in the context of jury selection; it is quite
another to imply, in the face of a constitutional jurisprudence bent on
narrow constructions of both race and ethnicity, that language or other
cultural differences among White ethnics and Blacks might receive differ-
ent consideration under a constitution which he claims reflects Black and
White experiences, or that such differences account for an insignificant
part in Black-White racialization. 0 2
Perhaps the most interesting among the issues inadequately addressed
by Professor Perea is his failure to consider the effect his emphasis on eth-
nicity might have on the very groups he seeks to protect. His arguments
allow for the reassertion of ethnicity-based claims by dominant White
ethnics, regardless of previous conditions of subordination. Such White
ethnicity-based claims, like White race-based claims, trump the mean-
ingful assertion of rights and the receipt of remedies by subordinated
groups. I agree that the Black-White framing of race should and will be
reconfigured, but Professor Perea's reformulation through ethnicity
promises more than it can deliver.
2. Conservative Ethnicity Theory
Migrants to the United States, voluntary and involuntary alike, are
either racialized or ethnicized, sometimes on initial arrival, other times
over the passage of time.10 3 This process is neither accidental nor prede-
102. Professor Perea does acknowledge the "Ebonics" debate, an argument over the
ability of Black public school children to learn in classes where standard English is spoken,
and he suggests that a departure from the Black-White racial paradigm could assist Blacks
in asserting language-based discrimination claims. See Perea, Normal Science, supra note 33,
at 1238 n. 115. Yet his very mention of this debate belies his point about the centrality of
Black experiences in antidiscrimination law and social policy. Moreover, incorporating
the experiences of others, purportedly outside the Black-White framework, will not assist
Blacks, as he argues, since, unlike Spanish and certain languages spoken by Asian Ameri-
cans, a central tenet of the debate regarding Blacks and language is that Ebonics is not a
language.
103. Professors Omi and Winant describe this process:
Particularly during the nineteenth century, the category of "white" was
subject to challenges brought about by the influx of diverse groups who
were not of the same Anglo-Saxon stock as the founding immigrants. In
the nineteenth century, political and ideological struggles emerged over
the classification of Southern Europeans, the Irish and Jews, among other
"non-white" categories. Nativism was only effectively curbed by the in-
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termined. Conservative ethnicity theory, which Professor Yamamoto asks
progressives to reject, has at least two essential components, only one of
which is adequately critiqued by many progressive scholars. First, conser-
vative ethnicity theory presupposes that over time all migrants will
assimilate-they will lose their preexisting national and cultural connec-
tions and assume an undifferentiated American ethnicity. 10 4 Conservative
theorists make race a component of ethnicity. Therefore, racial groups,
like ethnic groups, are assumed to assimilate. Progressives depart from
conservatives on this assumption at least in that some groups are subjected
to historic and continuing subordination.
Professor Moran engages this first component of conservative eth-
nicity theory by describing its connection to the subordination of Latinos.
In her view, the civil rights model ofjustice is based on the experiences
of Blacks and Whites. She argues that Latinos are not adequately pro-
tected by the civil rights model of justice because Latinos are not a
monolithic race: their ancestors are Black, White, and/or indigenous. She
argues further that Latinos are not represented under an immigration
model, which is based on the history and experience of ethnic Whites. '°5
stitutionalization of a racial order that drew the color line around, rather
than within, Europe ....
... By stopping short of racializing immigrants from Europe after the
Civil War, and by subsequently allowing their assimilation, the American
racial order was reconsolidated in the wake of the tremendous challenge
placed before it by the abolition of racial slavery.
OMI & WINANT, supra note 38, at 64-65.
104. Roger Sanjek attributes this transformation in the first instance to intermarriage
and contrasts his views with those of other scholars:
My interpretation of the historical significance of intermarriage in rela-
tion to ethnicity differs totally from that of Gordon, who sees
intermarriage as thefinal step in a series of cultural and structural assimila-
tions .... [I]ntermarriages began immediately upon each new wave of
European immigration. I suggest that these marriages became the social
vehicle through which cultural contrasts with "people we marry" were
constructed as ethnic on the part of the existing white American popula-
tion. Over time, as intermarriage rates increased with each generation,
there was less and less cultural stuff requiring any assimilation. Gordon's
intermarriage caboose is my engine of cultural change among white
Americans.
Sanjek, supra note 47, at 107 (citing MILTON MYRON GORDON, ASSIMILATION IN AMERI-
- CAN LIFE: THE ROLE OF RACE, RELIGION, AND NATIONAL ORIGINS (1964)).
105. See Moran, Unrepresented, supra note 33, at 141-42.
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However, like many progressives, Professor Moran does not ade-
quately engage the second component of conservative ethnicity theory.
This component masks the underlying purpose of initial ethnicization or
racialization of migrants to (and indigenous groups within) the United
States. Conservative ethnicity theory is superimposed on an understand-
ing of America as constituted initially, if not irrevocably, on a normative
Anglo-Saxon ethnicity. Other White ethnics-principally the Irish, Jews,
and Southern and Eastern Europeans-while initially ethnicized, in effect
were operatively racialized. They were considered to be less than norma-
tive, dominant Whites.'06 Through a variety of factors of assimilation,
including intermarriage and upward mobility (money "whitens"), these
nondominant Whites were eventually absorbed into an overriding
American, dominant-White ethnicity. 107
While in their nondominant state, these "other" White ethnics were
thought to be descended from cultural, religious, national, and linguistic
groups inferior to normative American Whites. However, they were
considered to have culture, to originate from nation states capable of self-
governance, to possess the power of language. Blacks, dominated initially
and continually by racial characterizations, have been presumed to lack
culture, language, and the intellectual power on which self-governance
and nationhood depend. ' 8 This characterization continues to dominate
106. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 38, at 64-65.
107. See Sanjek, supra note 47, at 106. He argues:
[Intermarriage] accorded ambiguously defined European "others" an un-
ambiguious white racial status in the United States. The boundaries of
"white" in the nation's history have expanded continuously with this
"naturalization" of non-British Europeans. In 1751, Benjamin Franklin
railed against German "aliens" whose presence interfered with the domi-
nance of "purely White People". Later nativist and white supremacist
groups would choose other targets, like Italians, Greeks, Slavs, and Jews,
all today safely considered white and marriageable by the majority of
white Americans.
Id. (citations omitted).
108. Roger Sanjek describes this relationship of culture to the Black-White racial di-
vide by examining patterns of intermarriage which, except in the case of Blacks, transform
race into ethnicity. Defining race according to the five-race framework of U.S. census
categories, he challenges the practice of assigning defining features to race and ethnicity:
In the 1980 census, 1.4 million persons identified themselves as American
Indian by race, yet 5.3 million whites (by race) claimed some American
Indian ancestry on the separate ethnic-origin question. There is. probably
some puffery in this second figure, yet evidently 5.3 million persons attest
to a nonwhite American Indian ancestor alongside European forbears but
simultaneously consider themselves white. For many of these persons the
Indian ancestry is remote, but for. others it is not. More than half of
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Blacks despite growing internal class distinctions (money does not always
"whiten").' °9 The superstition of ethnicity theory on a foundation of
American Indians today are married to non-Indian spouses, most of
whom are white ....
Race, where the possibility of intermarriage ended or was shunned by
whites, stood for biologically defined difference, and for the denial of any
conceivable or discussible cultural contrast within a white kinship net-
work. Offspring of any white-black marriages were considered black.
They did not inherit the ethnic identity of their white parent in any so-
cially recognized manner and were not incorporated into their white
parent's kinship network. Today's substantial white-Asian and white-
Hispanic intermarriage rates, however, raise the questions of whether,
and why, a contemporary round of race-to-ethnicity conversion may be
in motion. Will some white Americans, at least, accord ethnicity through
intermarriage across what have been racial lines and admit to Polish-
Mexican, or Jewish-Chinese, or French-German-Puerto Rican, or
WASP-Korean kinspersons?
The grounds for parallel conversion of race to ethnicity barely exist across
the white-black line, however, where the intermarriage rate is not high
but very low ....
Sanjek, supra note 47, at 105-08 (citations omitted).
Toni Morrison also alludes to the presumption of the absence of culture among
Blacks in her account of the initial encounter between Daniel Defoe's Crusoe and
Friday--a "'savage cannibal'-black, barbarous, stupid, servile, adoring..."
For longer than necessary, the first words he [Friday] is taught, first
"master," then "yes" or "no," remain all he is permitted to say. During
the time in which he knows no other English, one has to assume he
thinks in his own language, cogitates in it, explains stimuli and phenom-
ena in the language he was born to. But Crusoe's account suggests
otherwise, suggests that before his rescue Friday had no language, and
even if he did, there was nothing to say in it.
Toni Morrison, Introduction: Friday on the Potomac, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING
POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL
REALITY xxiii-xxiv (Toni Morrison ed. 1994).
See also BIRTH OF A NATION (Epoch Producing Corp. 1915), D.W. Griffith's turn
of the century film portraying Black elected officials after Reconstruction as buffoons
incapable of the reason required for participation in representative democracy.
109. See MARABLE, supra note 7, at 21-23 (describing the dimensions of the class divi-
sions among Blacks sufficient to put into question the very term "black community").
However, he continues to describe the effects of White privilege that threaten the lives of
Blacks of every social class. See generally ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF THE PRIVILEGED CLASS
(1993) (detailing racism against the Black middle class); ROBIN KELLEY, YO' MAMA's
DIsFUNKTIONAL! (1997) (criticizing social science research which sees urban Black ex-
pressive culture as nothing but pathology, nihilism, and compensatory behavior);
ORLANDO PATTERSON, RITUALS OF BLOOD (1998) (arguing that similar behavior leads to a
perpetuation of dysfunctional family patterns among Blacks, a pattern that can be traced
back to slavery).
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normative White American identity, initially formulated to circumvent
biological notions of race, merely builds on and reinscribes this faulty
foundation.
Professor Moran argues that the civil rights model is clearly based on
the experiences of Blacks and the immigration model on the experiences
of White ethnics. She applies this analytical framework to the problem of
affirmative action and the underrepresentation of Latinos in the affirma-
tive action debate. I do not quarrel with her basic arguments about the
inclusion of Latinos. But by creating a bimodal analysis of equality that
purportedly traps Latinos between Black and White models of empow-
erment, she accords the formal equality guaranteed under a civil rights
model unwarranted sanguinity and gives too little weight to the core of
the attack on race-specific remedies for all groups.
First, the civil rights model, like the immigration model, is founded
on the experiences of White ethnics, not on the experiences of Blacks.
Formal equality presupposes that the legal needs of the subordinated are
no different from the legal needs of the dominant. Second, the
supposition of formal equality leads to limited interpretations of
antidiscrimination protection, limits which Professor Moran readily
acknowledges, and these limits lead in turn to the need for race-specific
remedies. Yet the same suppositions of formal equality inform attempts to
dismantle affirmative action and other race-specific remedies for any and
all groups: group-based remedies depart from the guarantee of individual
freedom which has allowed today's dominant White ethnics to secure a
place of belonging in American social, political, and economic life.
Racialization processes create superficial distinctions among groups in
order to mask their substratal premises and their elemental effects on the
subordination of all dominated groups. The focus of progressives should
be on the racialization process itself, not on a Black-White paradigm
which cannot carry the weight many progressives would place upon it.
Professor Moran recommends an expansion of the notion of race it-
self to include social factors attributed to ethnicity; a deeper engagement
by Latino scholars of both the civil rights and immigration models for the
purpose of Latino empowerment; the abandonment of a monolithic no-
tion of race in the face of long-standing American practices of racial
mixture; and the deployment of Latino public intellectuals to transform
popular thinking regarding the limits of the civil rights and immigration
models. She argues further that as Latinos gain prominence in American
society, their experiences with race may catalyze the development of a
true multicultural democracy." °
110. Moran explains this dynamic:
As Latinos gain prominence, their experience may facilitate a thorough
reexamination of America's outmoded conceptualization of race ...
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Professor Moran's vision is admirable in its attempt to include all
groups, though her primary focus is on Latinos. But to consider
empowerment primarily, if not exclusively, through the lens of the
Latino experience may further distort our vision unless our focus is dead-
centered on the issue of whiteness, rather than blurred by a limited view
of the ideological underpinnings of the Black-White paradigm. With
respect to racial identity and racial mixture, she appears to argue on one
hand that Latinos are not a monolithic racial group-i.e., that their
ancestors are Black, White, or indigenous, suggesting that Latinos are
actually three distinct races-and on the other that they are a single
racially mixed group."' What she does not address is the propensity of
Latino identity to divide along lines of Black and White.' 2 This aspect of
Ultimately, though, the greatest contribution that Latinos may make is to
alert Americans to the ways in which [the civil rights and immigration]
paradigm[s] [have] become obsolete. Latinos may not fit the models
because the models just don't fit the complications of a multiracial,
multiethnic, multicultural, multilingual America.
Moran, Unrepresented, supra note 33, at 150-51.
111. If Latinos are not monolithically raced, what then are the races of Blacks?
Professor Moran acknowledges the ethnic tensions between native-born Blacks and
recent African American immigrants, but she does not clearly account for the ethnic
diversity among as many as 75% of native-born Blacks which includes a racial heritage
that is "also American Indian, European, Asian and/or Hispanic." See MARABLE, supra
note 7, at 222. Moreover, what is the meaning of the term "Black?" See Christine B.
Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African Americans, and the
U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1161 (1997) (describing the role of the law in the
monolithic, racial construction of African Americans). On the varied political uses of the
term "Black," see ROBERT FATTON JR., BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS IN SOUTH AFRICA (1986);
Charles R. Lawrence III, Race and Remedy in a Multicultural Society: Forward: Race,
Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1995).
Professor Moran does not demonstrate that Latino pan-ethnic or racial identity can
withstand the power of color and blood-based racialization that immediately subsumes all
non-Latino Blacks in the United States (and, presumably, some Black Latinos) into an all-
encompassing Black racial identity. National origin, religion, language, and culture have
not been demonstrated to possess similar transformative power either to create a separate
identity for Latinos outside of Blackness and Whiteness or to resist the power of whiteness
as an unstated modifier of American identity. It is difficult to accept the exceptionalist
frame of Professor Moran's description of Latinos or her hope that the Latino experience
will provide America an intimacy with racial mixture it has not always known.
112. Professor Baynes would modify this Black-White characterization by acknowl-
edging a dark-light racial dichotomy that cuts across racial and ethnic lines to represent
color-based racism between Blacks and Latinos on the one hand and Whites on the other
and among and between Blacks and Latinos themselves. See Baynes, supra note 51. Pro-
fessor Sanjek argues that Latino-styled racial patterns transform biological notions of race
into those based on appearance. Hence, Latinos often reject the identity choices of Black
or White in answering the U.S. census question on race, but do so because they under-
stand the designations Black or White in cultural terms: they do not consider themselves
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Latino identity may further entrench the Black-White racial paradigm, if
not formally in law and social policies, then in the actual material and
social conditions of racism. The mere existence of a multiracial
democracy does not spell the end of racism or important dimensions of its
Black-White frame.
Latino scholars acknowledge that the overwhelming majority of
Latinos-upwards of 95 0/--identify as White even though their sense of
the term may differ in some respects from its traditional connotation in
the United States.1 3 This difference leads to the observation that Latinos,
large numbers of whom are products of racial mixture, are not White in
the sense that this term has in the United States.14 In this respect, Latinos
mirror previous non-British White ethnic groups composed of both na-
tive-born and immigrant populations, citizens and noncitizens, which
were "raced" on cultural grounds and therefore originally not considered
White in the U.S. sense of the term. Whether or not Latinos will ulti-
mately mirror the pattern of White ethnic transformation from ethnicity
into dominant whiteness is not known. However, it is clear that the La-
tino sense of race, based to some extent on the experience of race outside
of the United States, does not completely reject the notion of whiteness
itself For example, ascribing racial identity according to European ap-
pearance in lieu of ancestry tracks critical aspects of the American
experience of Black-White race-based differentiation."' Nor can it be said
with certainty that a Latino sense of identity can or will withstand the
upward pull toward whiteness that defines American preferred racial
identity.
In addition to the incipient notions of whiteness intertwined with
Latino racial mixture, Professor Moran's vision does not take account of
the continued existence of significantly different rates of intermarriage
between Whites and Blacks (or Blacks with Latinos and Asian Americans)
culturally to be either Black or White. See Sanjek, supra note 47, at 120. Professor Moran
also refers to Latino rejection of Black-White identity choices for purposes of the U.S.
census but she describes these choices in racial terms. See Moran, Unrepresented, supra note
33, at 142. Sanjek argues further that notwithstanding the Latino understanding of race as
appearance, not ancestry, the biological underpinnings of centuries of White racial domi-
nance persist in continuing idealization of and preference for light skin, straight hair, and
European facial features. See Sanjek, supra note 47, at 120.
113. See Berta Esperanza Hemandez-Truyol, Building Bridges-Latinas and Latinos at the
Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric and Replacement, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. RaEv. 369, 384
n.54 (citing GERARDO MARfN AND BARBARA VAN OSS MARfN, RESEARCH WITH HISPANIC
POPULATIONS 2 (1991)).
114. See id.
115. See id.; see also Caldwell, A Hairpiece, supra note 29, at 383-85 (arguing that dis-
crimination on the basis of sex and race intersect along lines of White standards of
appearance against Black women).
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on the one hand, and between (and among) Whites and Latinos and
Asian Americans on the other. The ideology of whiteness has created a
hierarchy of races, represented by a concomitant Black-White paradigm,
with Blacks at one pole, dominant Whites at the other, and all other ra-
cial and ethnic groups represented in its middle continuum. It is precisely
the tow of whiteness that has transformed the racialized identity of previ-
ous White ethnics in the United States from nondominant or "other"
Whites to dominant Whites: intermarriage between nondominant and
dominant Whites created for the former a dominant White racial iden-
tity.1
6
Whether or not the prominence of Latinos will create a new sense
of multiracial identity in America, as Professor Moran suggests, or track
the historic patterns of transformation of racial identity to White ethnic
identity that have held for every group other than Blacks, is not known.
Much depends on the political scenarios which public intellectuals choose
to advocate. One possibility is a racially mixed identity that does not
privilege White over Black and resists the power of private and
governmental entities to force identification, even along Black-White-
Latino-Asian lines. Private and governmental entities may cause a split in
individuals' choices of racial identity: multiracial identity for private
purposes, reflecting fully the fact of racially mixed parentage, and public
identification for purposes of political and economic empowerment along
traditional polarized lines of Black-White-Latino-Asian designation. At a
minimum, progressive scholars need to acknowledge the possibility of
both enhanced recognition of racism against groups other than African
Americans and the persistence of a binary racial order with all groups,
except Blacks, above the line of acceptability.
116. Professor Haney-Lopez advocates the language of race as a paradigm for Latino
identity in addition, if not in contrast, to ethnicity. See Haney-Lopez, supra note 39, at
1158. He analyzes the way in which a claim to Mexican American whiteness complicated
the Supreme Court's ultimate decision to accord constitutional significance to the exclu-
sion of Mexican Americans from jury pools in its 1954 decision in Hernandez v. Texas. See
id. at 1158-72. His narrative alternates between a sense of predestined, state-imposed
racial identification for Mexican Americans based on biological notions and the pragma-
tism of Mexican Americans themselves to avoid the subjugation ordained for Blacks. He
notes that Mexican Americans advocated a third sense of identity which was neither Black
nor White, in the sense the frequent use of this phrase by current progressives suggests.
But, that third sense of identity was not simply neither Black nor White: it was both
White and "other." See id. at 1165-66. Professor Haney-Lopez does not critically engage
the current choice of Latinos to identify, predominantly, as White-whatever their sense
of the term-or the ideological dimensions of White identity either in the 1950's or to-
day, nor does he account for the effect of voluntary or imposed identification on the
demographics he projects for the next century. See id. at 1208-11.
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Like the power of the Black-White paradigm, the force of conser-
vative theories of ethnicity is sufficiently strong that simple assertions of
surface distinctions between socially constructed methods of group for-
mation and identification will not suffice. To end group-based
subordination, progressives must turn away from distinctions without
difference, to confront difference itself and the material conditions it en-
genders. With the advent of globalization and transnational citizenship,
pan- and multi-ethnic identity (both American and other) for all groups
may in the end be an appropriate goal for all Americans. But to attain this
goal on the basis of hierarchy-whether racial or ethnic or both-is an-
tithetical to the ideals which Professor Yamamoto and I believe
progressive race theorists share.
II. MOVEMENTS, MODELS AND THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF COLOR-ON-COLOR CONFLICT
Though the full story of the African American civil rights movement
of the 1950s and 60s remains to be told, its history, like that of slavery, is
rapidly being lost and misrepresented.1 17 Unlike some accounts of the civil
rights movement, which appear to be motivated by an intention to deni-
grate the moral and intellectual force of African American interests and
leadership, accounts from progressive scholars are not so designed.1 8
However, progressive scholars often attribute the limits of civil rights law
to the civil rights movement itself, and they sometimes imply that African
117. See D'SouzA, supra note 87 (arguing that slavery was not racist or ultimately
harmful for African Americans who escaped worse conditions in Africa through slavery,
and that the civil rights movement grew out of a commitment to theories of cultural
relativism which in turn led the movement to misconstrue the purpose and effects of
segregation). For critiques of D'Souza's thesis, see Richard Rorty, Color-Blind in the Mar-
ketplace, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1995, § G, at 9 (characterizing D'Souza's work as "bloated
with quotations and anecdotes, but [having] virtually no argumentative structure . . . The
only analytic tool Mr. D'Souza uses is his idee fixe, cultural relativism ... [H]e barely
tries to defend his startling claim that the civil rights movement developed as a direct
outgrowth of cultural relativism."); Dennis Cauchon, "End of Racism" Not Justified by
D'Souza's Means, USA TODAY, Sept. 28, 1995, at 4D ("What's most remarkable about
The End of Racism is not its controversial assertions about race; it's the nearly total lack
of argument provided to support these unusual views."); Charles Johnson, Widening the
Racial Divide, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1995, at 4 ("He has read an entire library of literature
devoted to race. But knowing what one has read and knowing America's racial history are
two very different things. That D'Souza still has much to learn about this country explains
his bizarre attempt to reintroduce racial stereotyping into our discourse when these are
noxious ideas that Americans of goodwill have no choice but to reject, regardless of how
pervasive such thinking may be.").
118. See D'SouzA, supra note 87.
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American social justice movements addressed narrow concepts of race and
were waged by and for African Americans exclusively.'19
Conflating the civil rights model of legal justice with the African
American civil rights movement 20 falsely suggests that the movement
took a monolithic approach to empowerment. 2 ' The civil rights model of
legal justice, and the strategies advocated by some civil rights leaders, did
reflect an attachment to an ethnicity paradigm based on formal equality,
but other leaders clearly rejected such an approach. Even the leaders who
advanced a strategy of formal equality could not have anticipated that the
civil rights model would result in a narrow conception of legal justice as
interpreted by the courts.122 Hence the limited conception of legal justice
which has emerged as the dominant interpretation of antidiscrimination
law cannot be laid at the feet of African American leaders, nor can it be
attributed to the intellectual limits of the civil rights movement.
Not only were the political strategies of the civil rights movement
intellectually richer than narrow concepts of legal justice, the struggle was
not waged solely around issues of race nor on behalf of African Americans
alone. 23 Racism has always played a significant role in African American
subordination. Critics of African American leaders have always assumed
that they advocate only race-based empowerment strategies in the inter-
ests of African Americans. This portrayal persists despite considerable
contrary evidence.
Claims suggesting a myopic, self-centered focus of African American
empowerment strategies serve only to exacerbate interminority group as
well as Black-White tensions. They often lead to a "Black stigma" and
119. See generally DONA COOPER HAMILTON & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, DUAL
AGENDA: RACE AND SOCIAL WELFARE POLICIES OF CIVIL RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS 2-3
(1997) (observing that efforts of civil rights organizations aimed at benefiting Blacks have
never overshadowed efforts aimed at helping all poor people).
120. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 38, at 128 (citing Lewis Killian, Black Power and
White Reactions: The Revitalization of Race-Thinking in the United States, 454 ANNALS OF
THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. SCI., 42 (Mar. 1981) and failing to distinguish be-
tween the civil rights movement and the civil rights model of legal justice). Killian's
comments more accurately characterize a legal model of justice than the civil rights
movement.
121. See Calmore, supra note 33, at 35 (noting that "[b]y 1965, Black Nationalists
challenged the viability of the ethnicity paradigm and its assimilationist conceptualization
of integration. Meanwhile Watts burned and blacks demanded group rights, including
something more than legal equality"); see also STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V.
HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA 53-57 (arguing
against integration as a strategy for people who suffer as members of a group).
122. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 38, at 185 n.61 (describing the emergence of
neoconservative strategies as "an attempt to confine racially based demands to an ethnic-
ity-oriented model of politics").
123. See HAMILTON & HAMILTON, supra note 119, at 2.
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cause other groups to define their interests in contrast to those of Blacks.
They also greatly understate the benefits of Black struggles and the civil
rights model of legal justice to groups other than Blacks.
Precisely because of the explosive nature of race and racism, African
Americans have had the difficult task of confronting racism while at the
same time advocating improvements in general social welfare, both for
the benefit of all who need it. 124 Black leadership often finds itself caught
in a proverbial catch-22: conservatives tend to scapegoat African Ameri-
cans for persistent economic and social inequality; progressives tend to
expect too much from African Americans."' If progressive theory is
124. Hamilton and Hamilton observe this dilemma for African American leaders:
Precisely for this reason [the persistence of racism], they have had to
chart a course that has required them to confront the explosive issue of
race in American politics. Perhaps more than anyone, they have under-
stood that race per se has been, and remains, a dangerously divisive aspect
of American life. They knew that pointing out instances of discrimina-
tion would likely stir up deep-seated animosities. And yet they
recognized that the struggle to achieve racial justice and economic devel-
opment had to be pursued on both fronts.
Id. at 259.
125. Interestingly enough, Marable attributes the failure of progressives to supplant the
civil rights model with new models of empowerment to the rise of the far ight in the
1990s and to the failure of African American leadership since the 1960s. He observes
further:
The great gift of black folk to American politics and society has been that
we have consistently fought for a more inclusive and humanistic defini-
tion of democracy, the relationship between people and the state. From
slavery through Reconstruction, and from the nadir of racial segregation
through the desegregation movement in the South, we have consistently
challenged the limited definitions of what democracy should be about. As
we have struggled, others within the society have been influenced by our
vision and sacrifices, and have joined the fight to expand the boundaries
of democracy. The inability of the black movement to develop new
theories and models of political intervention during the era of Reaganism
and the conservative domination of Congress under Gingrich has meant
that the entire spectrum of social forces left of center has fallen into dis-
array. White liberals, labor, feminists, and others, have not produced a
coherent statement to halt the movement to the right, because in the end
that alternative must be articulated by the most oppressed sectors of our
society for it to have a fundamental impact upon the social order. In
short, the struggles of black people, in conjunction with other racial mi-
norities and the poor, will prove decisive in the continuing battle to
redefine the nature and character of democracy ... This is why an
analysis of black political and civil society, its leadership and competing
ideologies, is linked to the development of a broader understanding of
what the future of American democracy may be.
MARABLE, supra note 7, at xiv-xv.
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to inform praxis, it is important that theory be based in the first instance
on an accurate factual foundation.
A. African American Social Movements and Black Stigma
Scholars properly attribute the existence of modern civil rights legis-
lation to the protest movements of the mid-20th century.126 But the
aspirations of the African American social movements of that time ex-
tended far beyond racial justice through law. Scholars who place undue
emphasis on legal strategies of the civil rights movement or who conflate
criticisms of the civil rights model of legal justice and the civil rights
movement miss this essential point. To limit African American social jus-
tice movements in this way, however unintentionally, trivializes their
reach and power.
Professor Yamamoto notes that the African American civil rights
movement centered politically and morally on legal strategies. 12 ' His views
on legal justice suggest that advocacy for nonlegal solutions necessary to
achieve actual social justice played at best a secondary role in the move-
ment's strategy. Professors Charles and Dona Hamilton present a different
account. They posit an African American social justice movement of two
dimensions, one focused on legal justice and the other on social and eco-
nomic empowerment not only for African Americans but also for other
subjugated groups. 128
The American civil rights movement and African American aspira-
tions for legal, social, and economic justice overlap, but are not
coterminous. The American civil rights movement, which culminated in
126. See Moran, Unrepresented, supra note 33, at 142:
The civil rights model in the United States is clearly based on the African
American experience. Modem civil rights protections arose primarily as a
response to the persistence of a caste system rooted in slavery. The civil
rights movement aimed to dismantle official segregative practices and to
promote equal opportunity without regard to race.
Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 5, at 845 (footnote omitted):
[T]he African American civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s
placed antidiscrimination law at the center of its political and moral
strategies, and in some important respects those strategies succeeded.
Over time, antidiscrimination laws compelled the state and federal gov-
ernments to bring their considerable powers to bear in prohibiting
intentional race discrimination in the public realm.
127. See Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 5, at 845-51.
128. See generally, HAMILTON & HAMILTON, supra note 119.
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the passage of comprehensive civil rights legislation 129 and is reflected in
the civil rights model of legal justice, has led to a near total separation
between legal rights and social and economic justice. 30 This separation
has led to the undermining of the apparent and potential success of legal
justice. By contrast, African American social justice movements have
never backed away from the need for a revolution in both arenas. To the
extent the civil rights model inherent in contemporary interpretations of
law lacks an analysis of class-based differences, a focus on economic jus-
tice and structural inequality, or fails to address aspects of cultural
discrimination, the fault does not lie at the feet of African Americans.
Professors Hamilton and Hamilton demonstrate through extensive
analysis and detail the "dual agenda" of African American civil rights or-
ganizations from the 1930s through the mid-1990s. 1 31 These organizations
consistently worked to promote economic and social welfare policies that
would not only overcome race-specific problems, but which would
benefit African Americans generally along with all other economically-
disadvantaged people. This aspect of African American civil rights and
social movements is hidden from view1 32 in contrast to the well-
documented struggle for legal justice.
129. This legislative product includes the comprehensive Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. See 42 U.S.C.A.
2000a-2000e-16 (West 1994); 42 U.S.C.A. 55 1971, 1973 (West 1994); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 3601-19 (West 1994). The movement also led to a resuscitation of provisions of The
Civil Rights Act of 1866, later codified as 42 U.S.C. % 1981, 1982. In its 1883 decision
in the Civil Rights Cases, the Court struck down other civil rights legislation involving
discrimination in public accommodations. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1893).
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was not involved in Supreme Court's decision,
the Court indicated that the 1866 statute should also be limited to situations involving
governmental action. See id. at 23; see also Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)
(holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 applied to purely private discrimination).
130. See Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifteenth Chronicle, supra note 33, at 188 (arguing that the
civil rights model lacks a class component).
131. See HAMILTON& HAMILTON, supra note 119, at 3-4.
132. As Hamilton and Hamilton explain:
There have long been two agendas working as the driving force behind
the actions and concerns of the civil rights organizations. These groups
have always focused not only on racial discrimination but also on issues of
general socioeconomic concern. The latter approach has probably been
obscured because racial discrimination had played such a prominent role
in American history. People have automatically assumed that when civil
rights organizations spoke and acted, they were doing so only in an effort
to combat the perfidious nature of racism in American society. To be
sure, this has been a constant concern precisely. because racism has been,
in various forms, a continuing presence in American society. Thus it has
been presumed that civil rights organizations, as interest groups, have
been steadfastly acting from that single motive .... Civil rights organi-
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African American civil rights organizations have long been admon-
ished to broaden their focus, to become "more attentive to social welfare
issues, to rise above a narrow focus on race and concentrate on helping all
people, especially the poor."'33 Hamilton and Hamilton point out that this
criticism and demand were advanced notwithstanding "clear evidence
that this was exactly what civil rights groups were doing and would con-
tinue to do."',
34
Claims about the limited moral, intellectual, and practical reach of
African American social movements continue today.' 5 These claims oper-
ate in tandem with historic refusals of many other stigmatized groups to
coalesce with African Americans even when their interests converge.1
36
zations have thoroughly understood the necessity of keeping a delicate
balance between their concern to end racial discrimination (both de jure
and de facto) and their equally important concern to bring about viable
social welfare policies for all Americans.
Id. at 258-59.
133. Id. at 2.
134. Id. The authors continue:
They always pursued a "dual agenda".... Frequently, when they
advocated policies, they were presumed to speak only for African
Americans. They were "civil rights" groups and consequently not
expected to concern themselves with issues other than racial segregation
and discrimination, and certainly not with economic issues that would
benefit all poor people regardless of race and ethnicity.
Id. at 2-3.
135. See, e.g., id. at 3 (Professor Theda Skocpol wrote in 1991 that "[c]ivil rights
groups tend to be preoccupied with defending affirmative action or pushing for measures
targeted on the nonwhite poor.").
136. Professors Hamilton and Hamilton describe the interaction among Blacks, Jews,
and Catholics during World War II and the post-war period regarding the fight for full
and fair employment and the establishment of a permanent Fair Employment Practice
Committee ("FEPC"):
According to historian Merl E. Reed, Catholics and Jews began to dis-
tance themselves from the movement as the Senate debates dragged on.
Though both groups had experienced employment discrimination,
Catholics resented "being lumped with colored people in America's
thinking' and Jews pulled back 'in the belief that their minority troubles
were social, rather than economic, in origin." Neither group wanted sta-
tistics to be published "that indicated that they had been helped by the
FEPC." This suggests that a "Black stigma" was attached to the
FEPC ... Other groups, such as Jews and Catholics, may have felt un-
comfortable as part of the coalition supporting the [effort] and about
being seen as having been helped by the FEPC because Negroes were
very visible leaders in efforts to abolish employment discrimination.
Id. at 65.
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Both often reflect a Black stigma: the inability to associate African Ameri-
cans with anything outside of narrow, race- and group-specific
particularism, and an aversion to being associated with African Americans
and their interests. 137
B. The Civil Rights Model for Other Non- Whites
I have already discussed the way scholars conflate the civil rights
model of justice with the Black experience of race by failing to see the
influence of ethnicity theories (and therefore the White experience of
race) on interpretations of the civil rights model. I have also argued that
scholars who claim that the Black-White framing of civil rights law leads
courts to neglect ethnicity erroneously attribute to the Black-White racial
paradigm the effects that principles like neutrality have on equality for all
groups. Here I want to address a different though related claim: the im-
plication that Blacks have benefited more under a civil rights model than
other groups.13 Not only is this implication wrong, it also supports the
137. Evidence of a "Black stigma" in relation to interests associated with African
Americans persists. For example, some of the underpinnings of the designation of Asian
Americans as a "reticent minority," including notions accepted by some Asian Americans,
reflect a similar need for dissociation from stereotypical notions about Blacks and Black
leadership. In the film Slaying the Dragon, a documentary analyzing the stereotypical rep-
resentation of Asian Americans in film and other visual media, California State University
sociologist Dr. Eugene Wong notes the connection between the image of an humble,
quiet, Asian-Pacific American community interested in preserving the status quo and the
intensification of Black protest in the early 1960's. Advancing the notion of Asian Ameri-
cans as a reticent, law-abiding minority was a deliberate attempt to embarrass civilly
disobedient Blacks. Thus Asian Americans are not constructed as generally reticent but
reticent in relation to Black militancy. See SLAYING THE DRAGON (National Asian Ameri-
can Telecommunications Association 1987).
The idea of reticence in relation to Black interests and the stigma associated there-
with has also been a part of the identity of some Asian Americans. Professor Pat Chew, in
an admirably honest account, reveals her reluctance to be identified as the subject of a
dispute regarding a faculty refusal to hire a Chinese woman professor. This dispute ulti-
mately led to the resignation of Professor Derrick Bell as dean of the University of
Oregon Law School.
I was not sure that as an Asian American I should be a beneficiary of af-
firmative action polices. Besides, I thought, I did not want or need that
labeling . .. Even now, I am ambivalent about revealing that I was the
candidate.
Chew, supra note 44, at 4.
138. Compare Chew, supra note 44, at 49 (arguing that the underrepresentation of
Asian Americans in certain managerial and other upper-level occupations is greater than
the underrepresentation of African Americans), and Moran, Unrepresented, supra note 33
(arguing that Latinos are left out of an affirmative action debate focused on Blacks and
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equally erroneous view that Blacks waged the civil rights movement for
narrow, selfish reasons, and it exacerbates intergroup conflict.
Some scholars do not distinguish the effects of limited interpretations
of civil rights laws, which retard the progress of Blacks as well as other
racialized groups, from the operational and ideological effects of the
Black-White paradigm. Racialized groups other than African Americans
have not been denied the benefits of civil rights legislation. Like African
Americans, their experience has not been uniform,13 9 but the guarantees
of civil rights legislation have benefited all and have led to general social
reforms."o Moreover, Professor Derrick Bell has demonstrated that the
civil rights model has benefited Whites as much as, if not more than,
Blacks.14 ' To the extent the Black-White paradigm reflects a continuum
of race, other groups have benefited not only on their own account but
also by being treated as "other" or nondominant Whites. Failure to ac-
knowledge these benefits perpetuates power evasion.
Progressives need to acknowledge that the likelihood of new legisla-
tion in the foreseeable future is remote, and that the attack on corrective
legal justice qua affirmative action is for some a more basic attack on the
Whites), with Rochelle Sharpe, Losing Ground, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 1993, at Al (noting
that during the 1990-91 recession, African Americans were the only group to experience
a net job loss while Whites, Latinos and Asians all gained thousands ofjobs, and reporting
that under affirmative action, efforts broadly conceived to include all minority groups
companies can show increased workforce diversity while masking African American re-
versals).
Professor Yamamoto cites the Supreme Court's decision in Hernandez in support
of his claim that the Black-White framing of racial discrimination marginalizes issues of
other groups by overlooking White relations with other non-Whites. See Yamamoto,
Critical Race Praxis, supra note 5, at 852 n.150 (citing Hemadez v. New York, 500 U.S.
352 (1991)). However, the fact that he describes the case without firther analysis-noting
only that a White attorney used preemptory challenges to eliminate Hispanic jurors-
suggests that he reads the case in much the same way as Professor Perea. I have indicated
earlier that Professor Perea misperceives the holding in Hernandez by attributing it to the
Court's inadequate ethnicity jurisprudence rather than to the dominance of principles of
neutrality. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
139. See George A. Martinez, The Legal Construction of Race: Mexican-Americans and
Whiteness, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997); George A. Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy,
Judicial Discretion and the Mexican-American Litigation Experience: 1930-1980, 27 U.C.
DAVIS L. R.EV. 555 (1994).
140. See DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 659 (3d ed. 1992)
(citing FREUND, THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE FRONTIERS OF LAW, in
T. PARSONS & K. CLARK, THE NEGRO AMERICAN 363 (1966)).
141. See id. at 659-60 (describing the benefits to Whites of racial remedies). Professor
Bell also argues that the rights of Blacks are only advanced when they coincide with the
perceived needs of Whites. See id. at 660.
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fundamental guarantees of civil rights law.'42 I do not suggest that scholars
back away from criticizing the civil rights model because it is being at-
tacked by neoconservative activists. However, I do suggest that they not
contribute to the success of neoconservative projects through faulty rep-
resentations of the effects of civil rights law.
For most scholars, the deconstruction of the Black-White paradigm
presupposes continued reliance on benefits derived from civil rights legis-
lation.143 All groups stand to benefit from working within the civil rights
model as well as continuing to challenge its limits. Groups (including
Blacks) disadvantaged by the Black-White racial paradigm will not be
better off in the absence of civil rights guarantees. Rather, the additional
claims that all groups choose to assert build on a civil rights foundation.
The conflation of the Black-White paradigm and the civil rights model
focuses erroneously on blackness and insufficiently on constricted inter-
pretations of the role of law in the attainment of racial justice.
C. Law and Color-on-Color Conflict
Professor Yamamoto adds another dimension to the criticism of the
civil rights model. He argues that the interracial conflicts which often
characterize contemporary civil rights litigation may demonstrate the ill-
fit of traditional antidiscrimination law for multiracial conflicts in "post-
civil rights America."' 44 He acknowledges that legal justice is still possible
for racial minorities, but criticizes the current conception and practice of
antidiscrimination law for its limited reach in the pursuit of racial justice
142. See D'SOUZA, supra note 87, at 544 (calling for a repeal of the Civil Rights Act of
1964); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992) (arguing that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 is no longer necessary).
143. This reliance is clearly the point of Professor Haney-Lopez's argument regarding
the salience of race for Latino identity:
Unfortunately, the construction of Latino/a identity in non-racial terms
continues as a basis for arguing that the remedies fashioned to redress ra-
cial discrimination should not be available to Latino/a communities ....
Using nonracial language to assess Latino/a racial identities risks obscur-
ing important aspects of experience and threatens to hide from view
racially determined conditions. It also facilitates a dangerous denial of the
legitimate need for as well as access to antidiscrimination institutions and
practices.
Haney-Lopez, supra note 39, at 1207-08.
Professor Moran also would expand, rather than supplant, the civil rights model to
account for Latino experience. See Moran, Unrepresented, supra note 33, at 150-51.
144. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 5, at 826.
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and for its failure to provide a jurisprudential framework for color-on-
color conflict.' 4 He also links the foundation of civil rights law to the
Black-White paradigm of race and argues that this framing of race blocks
the creation of a color-on-color jurisprudence.
Professor Yamamoto's call for a jurisprudence for color-on-color
conflict is odd given his critiques of both antidiscrimination law and the
ill-fit between progressive race theory and political and legal practice.
The courts have explicitly acknowledged color-on-color conflict in the
context of discrimination by one member of a racial group against
another member of the same group.146 Arguably, the Supreme Court has
alluded to the likely contours of a color-on-color jurisprudence (perhaps
including Whites as a color group) in cases such as University of California
Regents v. Bakke and City of Richmond v. Croson, decisions which Professor
Yamamoto would likely find inconsistent with his notions of legal or
racial justice.17 Courts are likely to create a jurisprudence that centers on
the interests of Whites, based on colorblind, neutral principles, even in
controversies involving color-on-color conflict. Moreover, the scholarly
literature addressing color-on-color conflict, to which Professor
Yamamoto refers, " 8 does so in the context of broad socio-political
disputes not easily reducible to or resolvable in the contours of specific
litigation. For these reasons, it may well be that color-on-color conflict is
best resolved outside of the judicial system.1 9
145. See id. at 852.
146. See, e.g., Walker v. Secretary of Treasury, 713 F. Supp. 403, 408 (N.D. Ga.
1989) (allowing an employment discrimination claim to be brought by a light-skinned
African American alleging discrimination by her dark-skinned African American supervi-
sor).
147. Justice Powell's reference to "a nation of minorities" in Bakke could arguably be
made within a Black-White framework that could easily be applied in disputes involving
color-on-color conflict to restrict the rights of non-Whites generally in order to protect
the rights of dominant Whites. See Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 292 (1978). One could argue that this is precisely the result of the Supreme Court's
decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 506 (1989), where among
other reasons for striking down the City's minority set aside program, the Court was
careful to express disdain for the City's inclusion of minorities other than Blacks, using
language suggesting-if not sure to foment-inter-minority conflict (stating "[t]here is
absolutely no evidence of past discrimination against Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian,
Eskimo, or Aleut persons in any aspect of the kichmond construction industry....
[O]ne may legimately ask why [Blacks] are forced to share this 'remedial relief' with an
Aleut citizen who moves to Richmond tomorrow?"). Id.
148. See Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 5, at 853 n.156.
149. Professor Yamamoto appears to call for the development of a color-on-color
jurisprudence that can be used by courts. See id. at 853-55. However, in other instances,
he appears to recommend a more limited role for courts and legal justice. See id. If he
means to suggest, for the reasons I have identified or others, that color-on-color conflicts
are best resolved outside of courts, he should say so unequivocally.
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Professor Yamamoto's description of the complex dynamics
involved in interracial conflicts, applied to the dynamics possibly
underlying the conflict in United Minorities, amounts to the strongest brief
possible against expecting courts to resolve more than a very narrowly-
defined aspect of the conflict. According to Professor Yamamoto,
Chinese Americans in San Francisco have long been discriminated against
in business, housing, and education, and discrimination continues: recent
immigrants are mostly poor and affected negatively by Proposition 187;
young Asian males are subject to police harassment; Asians are victims of
hate crimes; middle-class Chinese Americans feel discriminated against by
Whites and, through affirmative action, by Blacks and Latinos. On the
other hand, Chinese Americans in San Francisco are financially successful,
are rising in political strength, occupy significant state and local
government positions, exceed their proportionate share of the population
at state colleges and universities, and are considered by Blacks and Latinos
to be middle minorities receiving the benefits of White privilege in
exchange for their help in subordinating Blacks and Latinos. ' ° Yet
nothing in Professor Yamamoto's description suggests that the narrow
issue before the court is illuminated in any meaningful way or should
necessarily be expanded by the interminority dynamics he describes:
whether or not the institutional actors intentionally restricted the
employment opportunities of Blacks and Latinos because of race.
Professor Yamamoto argues that the dynamics of interminority con-
flict are different from conflicts between color groups and Whites, yet
many of the dynamics he suggests are at play in United Minorities appear in
traditional White-on-color conflicts, often mediated through the inter-
section of race and class. If scholars choose to advocate the development
of a jurisprudence for color-on-color conflict, they must abandon the
mere description of differences and specify why the differences they de-
scribe matter in the legal arena. If Chinese Americans--or Blacks or
Latinos for that matter-are agents of employment discrimination against
other color groups, then the institutional actors need to be found liable
even though Chinese Americans or others also suffer discrimination in
other institutions or other aspects of economic and social life.
Professor Yamamoto's descriptive and heuristic account of the
inter-racial dynamics in United Minorities also seems to be the very kind of
progressive race theory writing that practitioners find frustrating, baffling,
and not particularly helpful, and which contributes to the apparent
disjuncture between theory and practice that Yamamoto finds disturbing.
He speculates about the reasons for silence regarding the interminority
150. See id. at 857-59.
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dynamics by judges, lawyers, and parties in United Minorities, then
describes the features of antidiscrimination law that promote these
silences. He then describes the extension by courts of a colorblind
jurisprudence developed in Black-White conflict to color-on-color
conflict with much the same consequences as I have already suggested.
Finally, Professor Yamamoto questions why legal scholars have not
developed a jurisprudence for inter-group conflict. He concludes, as I
have tried to illustrate by examining scholarly treatment of the Black-
White racial paradigm and the civil rights model of legal justice, that
progressive theory lacks a coherent theoretical core on interracial conflict.
In short, Professor Yamamoto tells theoreticians and practitioners
what they already know without providing insights on solving the prob-
lem he identifies. Professor Yamamoto's guidelines for critical race praxis
are also marked by this abstract quality. In the next section I identify as-
pects of one of his guidelines needing further explication and attempt to
apply that guideline to the development of progressive race theory.
III. APPLYING THE GUIDELINES OF CRITICAL RACE
PRAXIS TO PROGRESSIVE RACE THEORY
The thesis of this essay is that Professor Yamamoto's assumption that
progressive race theory in its present state has much to offer practitioners
involved in interracial conflict is counterintuitive. Progressive theory
actually reflects many of the dynamics that Professor Yamamoto describes
as characteristic of civil rights litigation involving two or more sub-
ordinated racial groups. I have focused on the description and
reconstruction of the Black-White paradigm of race, and the importance
of the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s and the civil rights
model of legal justice for groups other than African Americans. I argue,
therefore, that Professor Yamamoto's guidelines for critical race praxis be
applied to progressive race theory. In this section, I apply one of his
guidelines to the ideology of whiteness, a central problem in racialization
processes to which progressive race theory pays inadequate attention
when theorizing interracial conflict.
A. Racial Group Agency and Responsibility
Professor Yamamoto recommends four guidelines for critical race
praxis, only one of which he develops in any detail: racial group agency
and responsibility. The guideline of agency and responsibility grows out
of the recognition of situated group power. Yamamoto argues that a the-
ory of situated group power "acknowledges the capacity of racial groups,
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amid changing racial demographics and socio-economic structures, to be
simultaneously oppressed and oppressive, liberating and subordinating."' 51
He further amplifies the idea of situated group power through four un-
derstandings. First, simultaneity suggests that groups can be at once
oppressed and oppressing; that is, simultaneity "is characterized by racial
groups that have resisted domination from above and have obtained some
degree of socio-economic power, and that situationally redeploy struc-
tures oppressive to them to oppress others." Second, positionality deepens
the idea of simultaneity by acknowledging that "[e]ach social actor is en-
gaged in multiple relationships ... defined at least in part by race, class,
gender, culture, sexual orientation, age, disability or locale." Positionality
provides insight into the idea of responsibility "by focusing on the posi-
tion and comparative power of an actor within each relationship, within
each context.' '5 2 Third, differential racialization recognizes that "racial
groups are racialized differently-that varying historical experiences and
current socio-economic conditions create different racial images, status
and power among racial groups, and that those differences contribute to
intergroup conflict." Differential racialization in turn accounts for
"differential racial group agency in the construction and maintenance of
racial hierarchies and differential racial group responsibility for disman-
tling those hierarchies ... Racial groups, even while themselves
struggling against domination by others, sometimes, and in complex
ways, exercise power over others and ... this exercise of power occa-
sionally generates or exacerbates interracial conflict."''5 3 Finally, the idea of
dominance-transformation forces the question: "Under what circum-
stances does the exercise of one racial group's power over another disable
the other in terms of self-definition or self-determination and thus entail
responsibility for interracial healing?' 5 4
Carrying out just this one of the four guidelines for critical race
praxis is obviously a tall order. Professor Yamamoto applies it to the con-
flicts in Ho and United Minorities and to the racialized debate about
immigration. Unfortunately, his application is largely descriptive, replay-
ing his account of the differential power relationships involved in each
conflict. More importantly, his application assumes a neutral, disinterested
assessor of situational power-one without a stake in the outcome of the
assessment. Who can say that when one group, or segment thereof,
presses a perspective on its own subordination that its reasons for doing so
are not legitimate, that it does so to oppress others, or that its refusal to
151. Yarnamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 5, at 890-91.
152. Id. at 892.
153. Id. at 893-93.
154. Id. at 893.
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acknowledge any subordinating effect on other groups amounts to power
evasion or irresponsibility? Groups may or may not agree with his judg-
ment that Asian Americans, or important segments of that community,
aligned themselves with conservative Whites to cast themselves as victims
of Blacks and Latinos in the affirmative action debate. 5 Blacks and Lati-
nos may not agree with this assessment since they, like conservatives and
liberals, may not agree about the propriety of affirmative action for some
or all Latinos. 1 6 Others may reject the possibility that genuine debate over
racial group empowerment can occur at the same time as debate among
conservatives without embracing or lending support to conservative po-
litical projects.' 7
Notwithstanding these observations, I believe that Professor
Yamamoto's agency guideline contributes importantly to critical race
praxis. The attempt to apply the guideline in concrete situations may
generate new opportunities for intergroup healing. It may also be an
important tool for restorying racism, which is essential to understanding
racism's differential manifestations." 8 I also believe it can usefully be
applied to the development of progressive race theory. Rather than apply
the notion of agency and responsibility to theory development around a
particular conflict, however, I think it may be more useful to apply it to
the notion of whiteness and the many locations of that idea within
progressive theory.
155. See id. at 893-94.
156. See Moran, Unrepresented, supra note 33, at 143-46 (characterizing the views of
Brest and Oshige regarding the appropriateness of affirmative action for Latinos).
157. Yamamoto acknowledges this possibility in discussing interracial conflict but de-
cides nevertheless to take the risk of providing support for those who would abandon the
idea that races are differently situated or that the law should acknowledge in any way the
fact that they actually are. See Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 5, at n.150
(citing Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances, supra note 5, at 70-71). See also Yamamoto, supra
note 5, at 864 (describing reasons for absence of a color-on-color jurisprudence).
158. For example, Professor Yamamoto presents a different account of the immigra-
tion debate than is presented by Tamayo and Moran. The latter scholars characterize
African Americans as the subordinated racial group which exercised its situational power
to coalesce with Whites against Latinos and Asians in the immigration debate. See Moran,
Neither Black Nor White, supra note 33; Tamayo, supra note 33 (describing the role of
African Americans in anti-immigration politics). Yamamoto describes the players as
Whites, African Americans, and Asian Americans combined against recent Latino and
Asian immigrants. See Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 5, at 836. None of these
accounts places Latinos among the anti-immigrant group, but the interplay of race and
class, which Yamamoto suggests placed some middle-class Asian Americans among the
dominant group, suggests the presence of some middle-class Latinos as well.
FALL 1 999]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
B. The Wages of Whiteness
The interrogation of whiteness among progressive race scholars is
not new. However, that scholarship is more often directed toward ana-
lyzing the ideology of whiteness among Whites than among non-White
groups. Still, in considering the reconstruction of the Black-White para-
digm, progressive race scholars are paying more attention to the role of
whiteness in the differential racialization of traditionally subordinated
groups." 9 Rather than repeat any of that discussion here, I want to focus
on aspects of the debate around the Black-White paradigm of race that
need further study from the perspective of their potential for reinforcing
whiteness.
1. Distrusting Demography
Most discussions of the Black-White paradigm of race proceed from
the assumption that current and projected demographic changes demand
its reconstruction. I do not disagree with accounts of the limitations of
the existing paradigm or with the view that rapid demographic changes
will reconfigure it. However, periods of high immigration are not new in
the history of the United States. In the past, the ideology of whiteness has
not decentered the Black-White paradigm, but has actually intensified it.
Whiteness has been expanded to include new groups. Thus current
demographic changes impel, but do not compel, a move away from the
Black-White framing of race.
I do not argue that the same pattern of absorption into dominant
whiteness will be followed with respect to the groups now making up the
lion's share of U.S. immigration, nor do I mean to exclude the possibility
that many Blacks can be reconfigured as Whites. However, it is at least
possible that whiteness will be redefined to include either groups or indi-
viduals now considered less than dominant White. In addition, blackness
may also be reconfigured to include more than African Americans. The
problem with the Black-White paradigm is not simply that a particular
group-typically, African Americans-is represented on the bottom. The
problem is that there needs to be a bottom group and that the bottom
group needs to be racially defined. The definition of the bottom can
center on biology; it can also be ordered around appearance rather than
ancestry, with a preference for standards related to biological notions of
Whiteness. These appearance standards are not just aesthetic but have
159. See discussion supra, Part I.A.
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real, material and psychological consequences. '6° Blackness may come to
be centered around class, class intersecting with but not supplanting race
as a signifier. The term "poor White" may come to be seen for what it
really is and has always been-another racial classification akin to "other"
White.
When applying the concept of racial group agency to the role of
demographic projections in the reconstruction of racial paradigms, schol-
ars need to be more attentive to the consequences of the reconstructions
they advocate and to potential redefinitions of whiteness and blackness.
They should also consider that demography can be used deliberately,
rather than inadvertently, in the service of particular reconstructions. The
principal ideological effect of the Black-White paradigm has been to cre-
ate a hierarchy of races with Whites and whiteness at the top, Blacks and
blackness at the bottom, and other colors and color groups along a con-
tinuum between the two. Economic and other social indicators, including
salient changes in demography, both capture and complicate but do not
completely reflect or supplant the essence of this historic relationship or
its ideological underpinnings.16 1 Selected social and economic indicators
can amount to no more than snapshots in rapidly changing social and
economic patterns. Gross statistical comparisons often do not support the
stories they are intended to enliven. Finally, nothing suggests that trade
160. See Baynes, supra note 51 (arguing that the light-dark paradigm of race reveals
significant advantages for light skinned people over dark-skinned ones and that this para-
digm cuts across traditional racial and ethnic lines).
161. Professor Yamamoto captures this aspect of the Black-White paradigm in his
description of the sociopolitical underpinnings of the United Minorities litigation:
Despite past and recent history, many Chinese Americans in San
Francisco are financially successful, Chinese American political visibility is
rising in the Bay Area, and Asian Americans generally exceed their
proportionate numbers at University of California Campuses. The newly
appointed city chief of police and state Supreme Court justice are
Chinese American, as was the recent Chancellor of the University of
California at Berkeley. Indeed, some African Americans perceive Asian
Americans as a buffer between whites and blacks, as the "racial
bourgeoisie" or "middleman minority" who, by their partially elevated
position in the racial hierarchy, undermine black charges of white
supremacy while nevertheless preserving white privilege and slowing
black advancement. Some mid-level Asian American managers confirm
that charge, at lease in part, through their complaint that they are used by
white superiors as the "pacifiers" and "shock absorbers." They perceive
that the are directed to fire or make unrealistic demands of lower-level
African Americans and Latinos while absorbing the flack and insulating
their employers from discrimination claims by virtue of their own
minority status.
Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis, supra note 5, at 858-59 (footnotes omitted).
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and other relations with foreign nations will not radically alter both the
White and non-White composition of current immigration patterns.
Through our own characterizations, we could find ourselves wedded to
new racial paradigms that do not represent racial reality any more accu-
rately than the existing one.
2. Racial Essentialisms
The idea of racial group agency and responsibility can also be use-
fully applied to the development of racial essentialisms. An analysis of
differential racialization is necessary to understand the varied operations of
White supremacy and to assist in determining the extent of a particular
group's situational power in a given context. However, differential ra-
cialization can also lead to power evasion. The analysis of difference need
not lead to false equivalencies among groups. At the same time, scholars
need to focus on the myriad ways a particular aspect of racialization, such
as foreignness or susceptibility to color-based racism, can be used to cre-
ate insignificant differences among groups. Blacks are treated as
perpetually foreign; Latinos and Asians are denied the benefits of racial
understandings when they are treated as White or its equivalent; any
group can be effectively racialized as much by being characterized as an
ethnic group as by being denied that characterization. Accurate descrip-
tions of differential racialization depend on keeping a simultaneous focus
on difference as well as sameness and applying both perspectives to the
analysis of specific interracial conflicts.
3. The Value of Whiteness in Assessing Racial Group Agency
A focus on whiteness will not avoid all the difficulties of assessing
racial group agency. The problem of the perspective of the assessor will
remain. However, developing color-on-color group perspectives on the
issue of whiteness may produce salient benefits. First, attention to white-
ness may help subordinated groups remain focused on hierarchy, the
central problem in racial subordination. Second, the inquiry into white-
ness can take place outside of the context of specific conflicts. This is not
to suggest that whiteness need not be considered in relation to specific
controversies; rather, we should also take the opportunity to assess white-
ness in somewhat less passion-inflamed circumstances. Finally, the interest
in decentering whiteness may provide meaningful common ground.
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The Content of Our Characterizations
CONCLUSION: RESOLVING DISJUNCTURE
I argue at the beginning of this Essay that Professor Yamamoto's
claim that there exists a divide of chasmic proportions between progres-
sive race theory and legal and political practice asserts too much.
Nevertheless, my view of the relationship between theory and practice
leads me to suggest that the guidelines he proposes for critical race praxis
should be applied to progressive race theory. The tensions he describes in
contemporary civil rights litigation exist in, though they do not derive
from, progressive race theory.
At bottom, the problem of disjuncture has precious little to do with
the Black-White racial paradigm or the civil rights model of legal justice
(though both need to be restructured), the other causes Professor
Yamamoto cites, or to the problems of translation and time lag which I
credit more than he. These factors merely provide a means of viewing
our society's crippling blindness to the inevitable results of separating
civic and political rights from social and economic ones.
Professor Miller's observations on the problem of persistent struc-
tural inequality, which I cite at the beginning of this Essay, lead us to turn
our attention away from ourselves to our children. In The Persistence of
Economic Discrimination, Elias Toma argues that discrimination persists be-
cause it benefits the powerful. He argues further that discrimination
cannot be eliminated, but that it may be possible to tame it. Like Profes-
sor Miller, Toma asks us to direct our attention to our children:
Probably the most fundamental and effective way of dealing
with discrimination is to promote equal opportunity of en-
dowment prior to or at birth so that no racial, ethnic, or
gender group will be subjected to 'acquired' (in contrast to
genetic) underendowment. No group would see its children
undernourished, undereducated, or left homeless because of
prejudice and discrimination, or because the parents cannot
afford the expense of caring for them .... This approach
dictates that the equalization of opportunities should start at
the beginning of life, not at the time one enters school, the
labor market, or the world of business.
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Professor Yamamoto directs our attention to the growing problem of
conflict among subordinated racial groups. I choose to combine his focus
with that of Miller and Toma by suggesting that progressive race scholars
direct their attention to our children, the most direct and immediate
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victims of our national crisis of race and class. All racism is not economic,
but the fact that we participate in the development of progressive race
theory and practice means that, unlike growing numbers of America's
children, we have been able to escape the worst effects of the economics
of racial discrimination.
Racism is about race. More races and racial advocacy can lead either
to more or less racism. Our relative powerlessness in the face of racism
can fuel competition and attacks on each other or lead us to find ways to
advance the goal of a multiracial, multicultural democracy that is also
nonracist. Discrimination will not be eliminated through our scholarship
but through a change in social conditions. We may be able to create the
climate that must precede positive social change by attending to the con-
sequences of the positions we advocate. The most important contribution
we make may be the change we bring about in ourselves and the im-
proved conditions we help to provide for all children.
